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ABSTRACT

Violence against police officers is a major problem in America. Previous studies on
violence and police officers have usually focused on violence by police officers, not
violence against police officers. This study is the first of its kind as it examines violence
against police officers from a comprehensive, criminal events perspective with detailed
use of force/officer violence data collected by the Orlando Police Department.
Individual officer characteristics, individual offender characteristics, situational variables,
and geographical factors are considered. Logistic regression results indicate that use of
force incidents are more likely to involve battery against one or more police officers
when multiple officers are involved, when offenders are female, when offenders are of
larger size (measured by weight), and when offenders are known to have recently
consumed alcohol before the incident. Spatial analysis results indicate that there is
significant clustering of batteries against police officers within the City of Orlando, and
that the areas where police battery is predominant are very similar to areas where
alcohol-related businesses are prevalent, and theoretically, more alcohol is consumed.
Policy implications and directions for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“One of the first things that’s imbued upon you when you come on this job is never think
this guy is gonna come peaceful. Always assume he’s gonna fight like Satan. With
anybody at all.”
-anonymous Chicago PD officer (Fletcher, 1990, p.16)

Violence is a common occurrence for law enforcement officers. Patrol officers
see violence on a regular basis and are often personally involved. In 2008 alone, the
FBI reports that 58,792 officers were assaulted, or about 11.3 officers were assaulted
per 100 officers in the US (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). Furthermore, over a
quarter of those assaulted were injured during the assault (n=15,345), and 41 of the
officers were feloniously killed (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). The frequency
of violence against officers has decreased slightly over the past few years, but is still
much higher than the levels of 1960 when officer deaths totaled 28 (Chapman, 1998).
While we are headed in the right direction, there is still a lot of work to be done to
protect the officers who protect us every day.
There are many reasons that we should want to learn more about violence
against police officers. Obviously, we want the officers themselves to be as safe as
possible, but there are other types of costs besides the psychological and emotional
1

issues associated with being the victim of violent crime. When an officer is assaulted or
battered, time and money are lost. There are tangible costs associated with all facets of
the violent encounter, including lost work time or reduced-duty time due to injury or
additional paperwork, in addition to medical costs, including ambulance services,
hospital and doctor visits, and medications—and most (if not all) of these costs come
from government funds, which, of course, come from citizens’ tax dollars.
According to the work of Robert Kaminski, foot pursuits alone in Los Angeles
County, California, resulted in an assault on one or more deputies in 42% of incidents
and injury to at least one deputy in 16.9% of incidents, including minor injuries such as
bruises and sprains as well as more serious injuries such as fractures and human bites
(Kaminski, 2010). A similar study of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department in South
Carolina (Kaminski, 2007) found that force was used against deputies in about one in
three foot pursuits, and nearly 40% of those pursuits involved serious force used
against the deputies, such as weapon use or fist or foot strikes. Thirty-three percent of
the deputies reported being intentionally injured by suspects during at least one foot
pursuit, with injuries ranging from very minor injuries which did not require treatment to
serious injuries requiring overnight hospital stays.

The costs of the intentional foot

pursuit injuries at Richland County were substantial, with a total of 273 days work lost
and 358 reduced-duty capacity work days (Kaminski, 2007), and of course this does not
include the costs of the medical care that was required due to these injuries.
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In the past, many studies have focused on the connection between police officers
and violence, but most of those studies have focused on the use of force by the police
rather than violence used against the police (see, for example: Gallo, Collyer, &
Gallagher, 2008; Hoffman & Hickey, 2005; Kaminski, DiGiovanni, & Downs, 2004;
Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; McCluskey, Terrill, & Paoline, 2005; McElvain & Kposowa,
2004; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2004; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2006; Paoline & Terrill,
2007; Terrill, Leinfelt, & Kwak, 2008).

Even so, there is a growing body of work

regarding the police officer as a victim. Most of these studies look for general correlates
of violence against police, but very few of them attempt to provide a solid theoretical
explanation for such incidents, and those that do are often limited in the effectiveness of
their explanations. Social events, especially crimes, are complicated by nature, and
therefore any viable attempt to explain these events will require a more thorough
examination than has been conducted in the past.
The current study is intended to increase the understanding of violence against
police officers and the factors that lead officers who use force against a suspect to be
battered by that suspect1. This will be accomplished through the comparison of use of
force arrests involving officer battery with use of force arrests not involving officer
battery. Data on violence against officers collected from the Orlando Police Department
will be examined through the framework of the criminal events perspective, a

1

Throughout the study, violence against police officers will be discussed in different terms. This may be
referred to as police violence, police assault, police battery, or police murder. In all of these instances,
the study is referring to violence against the police, not violence by the police.

3

comprehensive approach to studying crime incidents, which is explained in further detail
below. By gaining a better understanding of these situations and what leads to them,
we will have a better understanding of how to effectively protect officers through policy
changes and training recommendations. After a review of relevant existing literature,
the methodology of the study will be discussed, followed by results, discussion, and
recommendations for law enforcement policy and for future research.

4

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE AND THEORY

Existing Literature

The studies that have accumulated so far about violence against the police have
uncovered several factors which may affect the frequency of these incidents. These
studies usually focus on either general resistance against officers, assaults and
batteries against officers, or the unlawful deaths of officers.

Resistance against Officers

While there have been few attempts to estimate how often suspects resist arrest,
we know that suspect resistance occurs on a regular basis. Garner and Maxwell (2002)
report that suspects use physical force during an arrest in about 1 in 6 cases. When a
subject resists arrest, the extent of the resistance might be passive, or the offender
might resist by assaulting or battering the officer.

In extreme circumstances the

encounter might end with the officer’s and/or offender’s serious injury or death. Suspect
resistance may be the incident in itself, or it may lead to a situation that is much more
serious.

5

Few studies have been conducted on the possible predictors of suspect
resistance.

The notable exception is a study of police use of force and suspect

resistance in Phoenix, Arizona (Garner & Maxwell, 2002). In their study of 1,585 adult
custody arrests, the authors found that in 61.6% of the arrests, the suspects offered no
resistance.

In 12.4% of the arrests, the suspects offered psychological or verbal

resistance only, and in almost 9% of arrests, the suspects used or threatened to use a
weapon or physical tactic. Many of the potential predictors of force by police officer or
suspect turned out to have no effect or an inconsistent effect on the probability of force
being used. Among factors found to significantly predict suspect use of force were
increased numbers of police officers, bystanders being present, alcohol impairment of
the suspect, gang involvement, and violent offenses.
Of the few other studies regarding suspect resistance, the results were rather
ambiguous. Two of three major studies found race of the offender to be an indicator of
high levels of resistance. Belvedere, Worrall, and Tibbetts (2005) found that in southern
California black suspects were more likely to resist when being arrested by white, black,
or Hispanic officers and white suspects were less likely to resist when being arrested by
black or Hispanic officers.

Engel (2003) found that in Rochester, St. Louis, and

Tampa/St. Petersburg, non-white suspects were less likely to comply with white officers.
It should be noted, however, that this study used data that were collected thirty years
ago, and it is unknown whether or not trends have changed since that time.

6

None of these studies indicated that any officer characteristics were predictors of
resistance, but several suspect characteristics were deemed as important, such as
suspects being female (females were more likely to be disrespectful toward officers than
males) (Engel, 2003), intoxicated, disrespectful, and arrested for serious or violent
crimes (Garner & Maxwell, 2002; Kavanagh, 1997).

Contrary to these findings,

however, Belvedere and colleagues (2005) found that offense seriousness did not affect
the likelihood of resistance by the suspect. Kavanagh (1997) also found that when
suspects were in the presence of other suspects they were more likely to resist, but
Garner and Maxwell (2002) found resistance more likely when there were more police
officers and/or bystanders around.

Situational factors deemed most important for

predicting resistance were: contact initiated by the officer (as opposed to being initiated
by a call for service) and night-time incidents (Kavanagh, 1997), as well as beat area.
Beat areas commonly considered as dangerous by police were much more likely to
breed suspect resistance than other geographical areas (Belvedere et al., 2005).

Assaults and Batteries against Officers

Assaults and batteries against police officers involve intentional, physical attacks
and do not include mere passive resistance, although such attacks might occur while
resisting. Some sources report that police assaults have decreased consistently in
recent years (e.g. California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training or
7

CA POST, 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008), while others argue that the
number of assaults is generally static (e.g. Brandl, 1996). The FBI’s Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted (hereafter referred to as LEOKA) data indicate a very
slight decrease in the rate of officers assaulted over the past five years (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 2009) (see Figure 1). Research on assaults against police has been
more prolific than on resistance in general, and several factors have been advanced
which appear to correlate with these incidents.
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Figure 1: Rate of Officers Assaulted per 100 Sworn Officers by Year (FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed
and Assaulted, 2004-2008)
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A study conducted by Toch (1992) shows that the major motivations for police
assaults in general are in defending personal autonomy (i.e. not being touched or told
what to do), defending others, and efforts to escape. The FBI (1997) found in a study of
serious police assaults (which included cases of attempted but unsuccessful murder)
that 38% of the incidents were committed to avoid arrest or to escape, 19% were
attempts to kill the officer(s), 14% were attempts to frighten the officer(s), 7% were
attempts to wound, and 2% were attempts to immobilize the officer(s) (the remaining
20% gave no answer to this question). Sixty-four percent of the offenders in these
cases stated that the attack was impulsive rather than planned, and one-fourth stated
that there was nothing that officers could have done to prevent the attacks. Those
offenders who suggested that the officers did contribute to the attack stated that the
officers might have avoided said attacks by waiting for backup, discontinuing the arrest,
treating the offenders with “dignity and respect,” properly identifying themselves, acting
calm, or immediately arresting them upon arrival at the scene (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1997).
The “average” offender who seriously assaults a police officer (to the extent that
there is such a person) is male, in his mid-20s, single, and around 5’9” (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 1997). The offender is usually in good general health and almost
always has a criminal history (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006). At the time of the
assault, the offender has often recently used drugs, alcohol, or both (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2006; Stetzer, 2001).
9

Most serious officer assaults occur in situations when the officer has initiated
contact with the offender rather than being called to the scene (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1997). When the assaults do occur in response to calls, the calls are
usually of a disturbance nature (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997).
The officer almost always arrives at the scene of an eventual serious assault in a
vehicle, and usually it is a one-officer vehicle although other officers may be on scene or
nearby. Almost half of the offenders also arrive in vehicles, but almost half are also in
the company of others upon arrival (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2006).

The assaults usually occur outdoors, either on a

highway or roadway or in an alley. Although time frames are more difficult to agree
upon as some studies find that the most common time frame is 12PM-12AM, some
state that it is 10PM-2AM, and still others find it to be 4PM-midnight; most studies do
agree that the most common times for officer assaults are during the hours of darkness
(Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2006; Meyer, Magedanz, Dahlin, & Chapman, 1981). The slight discrepancies in these
times may be due to geographical differences as some studies cover assaults
nationwide while others focus only on one area, such as a specific city.
Only a few studies mention the days of the week that are most prominent for
police violence. Meyer et al. (1981) report that officer assaults are more common on
the weekend days. The FBI’s LEOKA data report that most officer deaths from 1999 to
2008 occurred on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, although there were spikes of
10

incidents almost every day of the week during at least one year (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2009). This source does not report the days of the week most common
for assaults in general, however, only felonious officer deaths. Only one other study
was found to have examined days of the week for assaults, and that study also
examined lethal assaults only. Among lethal assaults on officers that occurred between
1995 and 1999 in California, none occurred on Monday, four occurred on Tuesday, five
occurred on Wednesday, four occurred on Thursday, eight occurred on Friday, five
occurred on Saturday, and seven occurred on Sunday (California Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2001). While no particular day stands out as
most dangerous in these cases, it does appear that weekends are the most dangerous
times in general.
Another crucial factor in police assaults involves weapon use.

The most

frequently chosen type of weapon by far for general police assaults is personal
weapons, which include hands, feet, and other body parts (Brandl, 1996; California
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2001). Almost four out of five
assaults on officers employed personal weapons, about 5% employed firearms, 2.5%
employed knives, and about 14% involved other types of deadly weapons (California
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2001). Officers were generally
armed with their duty weapons, but at least one study shows that they rarely drew them
(Stetzer, 2001).
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Serious assaults on officers (those that attempted to kill the officer but were
unsuccessful) told a much different story. The weapons of choice in these attacks were
by far firearms, usually handguns. Most often the gun was brought to the scene by the
offender, about half of which had been involved in previous shootings in some way (as
either the shooter or the victim).

The primary reason reported for the choice of

particular gun was availability, followed by familiarity. In these more serious assaults,
only 40% of officers who were assaulted with firearms were able to fire back during the
assault (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997). While it is often assumed that the use
of a weapon means that injury is more likely, Kaminski and Sorensen (1995) actually
found that in Baltimore County, Maryland, injury was more likely when personal
weapons (i.e. bodily force) were used rather than other types of weapons.
Other weapons at the disposal of police officers (besides firearms) have been
studied, though not extensively. Robert Kaminski has conducted several studies on
police assault incidents and intermediate officer weapons, including some work on the
relationship between the use of oleoresin capsicum spray, or OC spray (pepper spray),
and officer assaults. Kaminski, Edwards, and Johnson (1998) tested the “Velcro effect,”
which refers to the compliance of an offender after hearing the officer open the Velcro
pouch (or in some cases the snap pouch) containing his OC spray. The idea behind the
Velcro effect is that further violence is deterred when threatened with the spray because
many offenders have either experienced OC personally or have heard about its effects.
OC spray has been widely adopted as a defensive weapon by police agencies but has
12

not been studied extensively.

Kaminski and colleagues tested the Velcro effect by

comparing police assaults both before and after the adoption of OC spray in Baltimore
County and found that the weapon had a statistically significant effect on officer
assaults, decreasing incidents by 3.2 per month (Kaminski et al., 1998).
Another intermediate weapon of officers which is now widely used is the
conducted energy device, or CED (i.e. Taser). Smith, Kaminski, Rojek, Alpert, and
Mathis (2007) studied the impact of the CED on officer and suspect injuries in two
agencies. In one agency, the CED made both officer and suspect injury less likely as
well as reducing the seriousness of suspect injuries. In the other agency, CEDs were
not found to decrease the odds of injury, but pepper spray was. The authors concluded
that while more research is needed on CEDs, their use and the use of pepper spray
could reduce the likelihood of injury to both officers and suspects, especially over handto-hand combat techniques, which are more likely to cause injury.
Another factor that appears to be important in understanding police assaults,
both regionally and by areas as small as neighborhoods, is the geographic area in
which the assault occurs. Officers are assaulted more often in the South than in any
other region of the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997).

It also

appears that in at least some jurisdictions, as with resistance in general, certain smaller
areas such as neighborhoods are overrepresented (generally those areas widely
considered to be “bad neighborhoods”) (Stetzer, 2001). Kaminski, Jefferis, and Gu
(2003) found similar results in Boston when they studied the effects of block-level
13

variables on violence against police. Results indicated that aggravated assaults against
police officers are more common in block groups that have a high density of arrestees,
as well as heightened levels of crime and violence.
There have also been a few studies conducted on the associations between
police assaults and specific types of calls for service. Hirschel, Dean, and Lumb (1994),
for example, studied the relationship between police assaults and consequent injuries
and domestic violence in Charlotte, North Carolina. Contrary to popular conjecture,
domestic violence was not found to cause more injuries to officers than other calls,
leading the authors to suggest that officer safety policies should focus on general safety
rather than strategies related specifically to domestic violence. Rabe-Hemp and Schuck
(2007) found that domestic violence situations led to an increased risk of assault for
female officers over that of their male counterparts, so it is possible that the gender of
the officer has an effect on the situation that has not been found in prior studies of
violence against officers and domestic violence.
Another study was conducted on police safety and traffic stops, another situation
commonly claimed to be very dangerous for police officers. The researchers found that
police deaths and assaults were rare when conducting traffic stops, and that traffic
stops were not as dangerous as they had previously been deemed (Lichtenberg &
Smith, 2001). These results were relative to the frequency of traffic stops, which are
one of the most frequent duties of police officers, and carried out by most officers on a

14

daily basis. The actual number of officers assaulted while conducting traffic stops is still
higher than when officers were assigned to most other duties.

Officer Deaths

It is difficult to determine the factors that might make police officers less likely to
suffer assaults, and it is even more difficult to do so with intentional deaths of police
officers. When dealing with police assaults, the officer’s perspective on the situation is
available; when dealing with police deaths, investigators and researchers often must
take their best guess at the particulars of the situation. Sometimes the offender will talk
about the incident if he or she was not also killed. At other times, there is evidence from
the officer’s in-car camera or body microphone, if available. There may be statements
from other officers, offenders, or witnesses, but often there is very little to go on when
studying these situations. There are, however, many more data collected on felonious
police deaths than assaults in general, and consequently much more research has been
conducted on police deaths than on police assaults.
Most researchers agree that police deaths increased from about 1960 until the
early 1970s, and then started a descent that continued at least through the mid-1990s
(Batton & Wilson, 2006; Chapman, 1998; Quinet, Bordua, & Lassiter, 1997). There are
many suggested reasons for the decline, several of which probably worked together to
lower the police homicide rate. First and foremost is the adoption and technological
15

advancement of body armor, which has undoubtedly saved many officers’ lives. Also,
there have been numerous advances in police training, technology, and research on top
of the fact that police behavior has been under much more scrutiny than in previous
eras. Also, advances in emergency medical treatment have probably played a role
(Batton & Wilson, 2006; Harris, Thomas, Fischer, & Hirsch, 2002). Trauma care for
injuries such as gun and knife wounds and head blows is available much more quickly,
leading to the increased likelihood of survival when faced with what would previously
have been fatal injuries (Harris, et al., 2002).
While rates of police homicide continue to generally decrease according to
existing literature and FBI LEOKA data (see Figure 2), they are still unreasonably high.
After continuing to decline since the early 1970s the number of deaths is still much
higher than in 1960 when the low reached 28 (Chapman, 1998). In 2008, the FBI
reports that 41 officers were feloniously killed (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009).
Police officers continue to be intentionally killed more than any other occupational group
except taxi drivers and chauffeurs (United States Postal Service Commission on a Safe
and Secure Workplace, 2000 and Castillo & Jenkins, 1994). From 1992-1997, police
homicides still accounted for half of all deaths of law enforcement (Clarke, 1999).
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Figure 2: Felonious Deaths of Law Enforcement Officers (FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed and
Assaulted, 2004-2008)

To understand the dynamics involved in the killing of police officers, we turn to
studies conducted by the FBI. Killed in the Line of Duty (1992) was the first of the FBI’s
three major studies on violence against law enforcement. It focused specifically on
officers who were murdered on duty. The study examined in detail the cases of fifty-one
incidents (which were not selected randomly) in which officers were slain and found
similar results to the police assault cases studied. Officers in the study were generally
white males with a high school education.

The murdered officers were usually

responding to disturbance calls in one-officer vehicles, and were most often killed with
handguns. Offenders were of mixed races with a narrow white majority, were generally
17

male, and had no more than a high school education.

Most often, the offenders were

using drugs and/or alcohol.
Again, we should be aware that these incidents were not randomly selected, so
caution must be used with any generalizations drawn from this study.

King and

Sanders (1997) assert that the results of the FBI’s study are not supported by the
national LEOKA data, which are also compiled by the FBI, because the non-random
selection of cases for this study led to biased findings, namely in the representativeness
of the “average” offender.
The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)
(2001) conducted a similar study using LEOKA data for the state of California (hereafter
referred to as the California POST study). The study found that of thirty-three officer
slayings in California from 1995-1999, all of the officers were killed with guns
(predominantly handguns), although there was a reported ten percent increase in the
use of assault rifles against officers since the previous five-year report. Most incidents
occurred in urban and suburban areas during spring and summer. The majority of the
murders were on weekends, although there were cases spread across most weekdays.
Most often the incidents occurred during the hours of darkness.
Most of the slain officers in the California POST study were wearing body armor;
of the seven officers who were not, three were off-duty at the time of the murders. All of
the officers except two who were off-duty were armed, and of these officers one-third
were able to draw and fire their weapons and one officer was able to kill his murderer.
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The officers’ fatal wounds were mostly to the head and chest, and most officers were
shot only once. In four cases, the specific bullets used defeated the officers’ issued
body armor. About half of the murdered officers were killed within one minute of their
arrival on scene, and about two-thirds had either no back-up or only one additional
officer present. The majority of offenders in the California POST study were also alone,
and about eighty-five percent of them had criminal records.
Other studies have come to similar conclusions. Chapman (1998) found that
most officers who were murdered were responding to a disturbance, a robbery, or
attempting arrest, and that handguns were the most common weapons used to kill
officers. Chapman also found that the weekends were more fatal to officers, but not by
a large margin, and that half of the murders occurred between 6PM and 2AM, with the
most deadly times between 10PM and midnight. He also reports that female officers
tend to die in the same circumstances as their male counterparts (Chapman, 1998).
Fridell and Pate (2001) also found that the vast majority of officer murders were
committed with handguns. They report that about 16% of the officers were disarmed,
and of these most were killed with their own weapons. One-third of the murdered
officers were wearing body armor but were killed anyway either because they were hit in
another body location, their armor did not stop the particular type of bullets used, or the
bullet circumvented the armor. In cases of circumvention, the bullet usually went either
in the unprotected side of the body or just above or below the vest (Fridell & Pate,
2001).
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As with police assaults in general, those assaults that result in officer deaths also
appear to have a geographical dimension.

Kaminski, Jefferis, and Chanhatasilpa

(2000) performed a cluster analysis on police deaths in the United States and found that
while the South may not be the most dangerous place for officers in the United States, it
is definitely among the top clusters when it comes to police deaths, along with large
cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, DC. The authors
report that while the rate is very high in the South, police fatalities most often occur in
metropolitan areas in general. Kaminski (2008) also found that economic depression
was a statistically significant predictor of police homicides when compared at the county
level.
In another study related to social conditions and violence against police, Jacobs
and Carmichael (2002) examined large US cities (with population over 100,000) in
relation to their risk factors for police. They assert that danger factors include cities with
higher divorce rates, higher rates of violent crime, and especially cities with larger
disparities in resources available to whites and blacks (in general, areas of high social
disorganization). They report that police murders are higher in cities where blacks have
less political influence. For example, the deaths seem less prevalent in cities with black
mayors, even if those cities have economic inequality between white and black citizens.
However, Kaminski and Stucky (2009) found in a reanalysis of this study that there was
no support for the black mayor hypothesis and that the finding may have been based on
the specific model used. After addressing methodological issues brought up in Jacobs’
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rebuttal (2010) and running additional analyses, Kaminski and Stucky (2010) still found
that the black mayor hypothesis was not statistically robust. Also, Kaminski (2008)
found that there was no correlation between police murders and divorce rates as
originally reported by Jacobs and Carmichael (2002).
While many studies have attempted to determine correlates of police violence,
fewer have rigorously examined social factors that might affect the rates of police
homicide. A notable exception, Kaminski and Marvell (2002) found in a longitudinal
study of felonious deaths of officers that many factors assumed to affect the number of
police deaths do not have a statistically significant effect. These include changes in the
crack epidemic, executions, access to firearms, and emergency medical care (although
the authors warn that more valid measures of emergency care are needed).

The

authors found that the factors which affect the police homicide rate are generally the
same as those which affect the overall homicide rate, such as the condition of the
economy. However, these factors seem to affect police homicides to a larger extent.
Another study, conducted by Mustard (2001), examined the impact of gun laws on
police deaths and reported that concealed weapons permits and gun purchase waiting
periods did in fact lower police deaths, although only slightly.
The studies reviewed above represent a growing body of research about
individual and social factors which correlate with police violence or which affect these
situations as they are occurring; however, there is relatively little knowledge about why
police violence occurs. Can violence against the police be explained in the same ways
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as violence in general?

Do incidents of violence against the police have different

causes or characteristics than general violent incidents? Violence against officers may
be undertaken in an attempt to prevent arrest or in efforts to resist the current social
control system, reasoning that obviously would not apply in the average case of a
simple assault and battery. This underscores the importance of developing a theoretical
framework to explain police violence, something only a few studies have attempted to
this point.

Explaining Police Violence

Some studies of the correlates of police violence have indirectly tested
explanations of resistance to, and assaults of, police officers. For example, some prior
studies have tested political or conflict-related factors (i.e. Belvedere, Worrall, & Gibbs,
2005; Engel, 2003; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009) and others
have examined variables that may align with subcultural explanations (i.e. Kaminski,
Jefferis, & Chanhatasilpa, 2000). Most studies conducted on police violence to this
point have focused only on limited theoretical factors if any, seriously limiting the
explanatory power of current literature on this topic. Violence against police officers is a
quite complicated matter, and only a thorough theoretical perspective that takes into
account individual, contextual, and social factors will be truly useful in explaining such
incidents.
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Kaminski (2002) provides one such example of a more holistic explanation of
police violence in his use of routine activities theory. Developed by Cohen and Felson
(1979), routine activities theory specifies that crime occurs upon the intersection of a
suitable target, a motivated offender, and a lack of capable guardianship. Rather than
focusing only on the offender, as many criminological theories of the past, routine
activities theory was revolutionary in that it forced the consideration of victim and
situational characteristics as well.
The concept of the motivated offender may not apply to police assaults in the
traditional sense because most police assaults are unplanned attempts to escape
arrest; in cases of violence against police officers it is more likely that the offender
becomes motivated after the encounter between officer and offender has begun.
Kaminski (2002) argues that police officers may make suitable targets if an offender is
motivated by his or her wrongdoing and the knowledge that s/he will go to jail or prison if
caught. Guardianship for police officers may theoretically be provided by firearms, body
armor, and the like, although in Kaminski’s 2002 study these factors were not found to
reduce police murders. These variables and others affecting the proximity of targets to
offenders, geographically speaking, and the exposure of the officer targets to said
offenders may help to explain officer murders.
Fridell, Faggiani, Taylor, Brito, and Kubu (2009) also use routine activities theory
to explain police violence and build on Kaminski’s (2002) work by examining agencylevel variables for their possible significance to police violence. Using data from the
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National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the authors studied three years of
assaults and killings of police officers in the US. They found statistically significant
relationships between police violence and the agency body armor policies (i.e. agencies
that required the use of body armor by officers experienced fewer police assaults), the
level of accountability taken by agencies as evidenced by the highest level of supervisor
who reviewed use of force reports, and the violent crime rate in the area. These are all
factors that can be explained using the concepts that routine activities theory
encompasses.

Requiring the use of body armor by an agency affects the level of

guardianship, as does the level of accountability assumed by the agency, and an area’s
violent crime rate affects the proximity of suitable targets—in this case, police officers—
to motivated offenders, who are generally more plentiful in areas with higher crime
rates.
The works of Kaminski (2002) and of Fridell et al. (2009) represent a broader
theoretical approach to explain violence against police that is necessary to encompass
all relevant explanatory factors. Unfortunately, these studies stand alone in the use of
this more comprehensive approach to studying violence against police, and while
routine activities theory may be able to explain how and under what circumstances
police assaults occur, the current study is focused on why these assaults occur, a task
for which the criminal events perspective is more appropriate.
The criminal events perspective, which is similar to routine activities theory in that
it considers multiple facets of crime occurrence rather than solely the offender, is the
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theoretical framework which was employed in the current study.

This theoretical

perspective originally grew out of Luckenbill’s (1977) idea of homicide as a situated
transaction in which the victim and offender act, in turn, based on their perception of the
other’s stance. Luckenbill describes a six-stage process in which victim and offender
interact in a designated order, all of which are situated in a specific social situation.
Stage one occurs when the victim performs some act which the offender perceives as
being offensive toward him/herself, whether the victim intended this act to be offensive
or not. This interpretation of the victim’s act as offensive comprises stage two of the
process, and in stage three the offender chooses a response to this perceived offense,
either in the form of excusing the behavior, retreating from the interaction, or retaliating.
In Luckenbill’s cases of murder, and presumably in the cases of all types of violent
crime, the offender chooses the third option. In stage four, the victim now makes his or
her choice, either to challenge the offender, to apologize, or to retreat from the situation.
If the victim chooses to stand up to the offender, the transaction moves on to stage five,
in which both victim and offender have stood up to each other and cannot back down
without losing face, so they “commit to battle,” which one of the actors in the transaction
inevitably loses. Finally, in stage six, the offender again makes a decision, this time
either to retreat from the scene or to wait on scene for the arrival of police officers;
conversely, the offender may be forced to wait for the arrival of police officers by others
at the scene. This, according to Luckenbill, marks the end of the situated transaction.
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The criminal events perspective, as developed by Sacco and Kennedy (2002),
grew from this idea of the situated transaction, and was designed to encompass not
only the situation of the offender, but also that of the victim and of the social
circumstances surrounding a criminal incident. Sacco and Kennedy assert that criminal
events, like other social phenomena, have a beginning, middle, and end—each event
has precursors, the actual transaction, and the aftermath of the transaction, which are
all affected by the social situation, the environment, and the perspectives of all those
involved in the event. Precursors to an event are the factors that bring the involved
parties together in time and space. The transaction itself (i.e. when the actual event
occurs) may involve any number of factors defined by the characteristics of the
particular situation, such as whether the event occurs in a crowded parking lot or an
isolated alley, whether one or all of the participants have been drinking alcohol or
consuming other mind-altering substances, etc.

Finally, the aftermath of the event

might include reactions of the actors, witnesses of the event, police officers, and the
community at large, as well as the effects of the crime on any victims and the attitudes
and feelings of any offenders toward the event.
Rather than focusing solely on the offender who wishes to commit a crime, the
criminal events perspective places the offender as one of several important facets of the
situation. The victim, bystanders, police officers, where and when the crime occurs, and
the social and physical environments are also acknowledged as playing a role. As
Sacco and Kennedy (2002) point out, the fact that an offender wishes to commit a crime
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does not necessarily mean that a crime will occur. For a crime to take place, the
opportunity to commit the crime must arise, and this is where the other factors come
into play.
While the criminal events perspective has never been applied to violence against
police officers, there have been empirical tests of the theory based on other types of
violent crime. Sherley (2005) used the criminal events perspective to study sexual
assaults through the use of police case files.

This allowed for a more thorough

examination of the incidents in which the author could consider the unique
circumstances of each actor. She consequently discovered that importance lay not only
in the intersection of the victim, offender, and lack of guardianship, but also with the
dynamics of these interactions and the relative importance of each actor.
Another study which utilized the criminal events perspective to study violent
crime was conducted by Weaver et al. (2004).

Based on NIBRS data, this study

examined factors from six categories comprising the idea of the criminal event in an
effort to understand what factors affect the lethality of interpersonal violent crime. The
study found the criminal events perspective to be an effective tool for understanding the
correlates of lethality as variables all facets of the criminal event were determined to
affect lethality, with the circumstance of the assault and the weapon used found to make
the strongest difference.
The criminal events perspective has never been used to study police violence,
but there is reason to believe that it would be useful in doing so. Routine activities
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theory has been successfully used to study police violence in the past (Fridell et al.,
2009; Kaminski, 2002), and the criminal events perspective may be viewed as an
extension and/or broadening of routine activities theory. Some comparisons may also
be drawn between factors that affect violence against the police and violence in general,
but the effects are still ambiguous. Using data from the National Law Enforcement
Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), Kaminski and Marvell (2002) found that while some
of the same factors (such as economic growth and decline) affect both police homicides
and general homicides, they are affected at much different rates with police homicide
trends being influenced much more than general homicide trends.
As noted above, the criminal events perspective places emphasis on how actors
and circumstances come together in space and time to lead to the commission of a
crime; where and when incidents occur is an important part of understanding why
incidents occur.

The social environment in which actors are situated is of high

importance in determining how an event will unfold, so any study hoping to uncover
causes of police violence must consider the characteristics of the neighborhoods in
which these incidents are common, something that can be accomplished through
looking at an area’s level of social disorganization.
Theories of social disorganization have flourished in recent years, and for good
reason: many types of crime can be explained by the characteristics of the geographical
area in which the crime occurred. Since the early days of the Chicago School and the
groundbreaking works of Park and Burgess (1925) and Shaw and McKay (1942), social
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disorganization theory has been tested time and again. The basic logic behind this
perspective is that residents of a community normally exert social control in the public
spaces in their area in order to maintain a safe neighborhood. When these informal
social control networks break down, the community loses its control over the area, and
crime, or originally, delinquency occurs (Shaw & McKay, 1942). When neighbors stop
investing in their community by getting to know each other and maintaining a support
network together, citizens can quickly lose the feelings of comfort and safety that they
once enjoyed. Soon indicators of social disorganization arise, including high poverty
levels, high population turnover, high population heterogeneity (Shaw & McKay, 1942),
and an increase in female-headed households (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993).

When

indicators of social disorganization arise within a community, increases in crime
generally follow.
Social disorganization theory has undergone considerable empirical testing in
recent years and the perspective has gained a substantial amount of support. Several
studies have demonstrated that crime incidents, offender locations, and attitudes about
crime vary by geographical area and that crime is often concentrated in certain
neighborhoods, usually where there is less informal social control (for example, see
Button, 2008; Martinez, Rosenfeld, & Mares, 2008; Mustaine, Tewksbury, & Stengel,
2006). When a neighborhood has less informal social control over its public spaces,
more crime occurs (Sampson & Groves, 1989). This increase in crime inevitably leads
to a higher police presence, which leads to more interactions between citizens and
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police officers in areas where a higher proportion of citizens may be involved in criminal
activity and do not wish to have a higher level of contact with the police. This can lead
to further hostility between the police and citizens in the neighborhood. In these highcrime areas where animosity towards police as well as formal authority in general is
bred, the environment is naturally ripe for more violence to occur between police and
citizens in that area; the police and potential attackers are often in close proximity to
one another and there are more subjects in these neighborhoods who are motivated to
avoid arrest by whatever means necessary. Therefore, socially disorganized areas are
likely to experience more cases of violence against the police than socially organized
neighborhoods.
While these links between social disorganization and police violence have not
been studied extensively, there have been significant relationships found between some
social disorganization factors and the murder of police officers.

Poverty (Chamlin,

1989), unemployment (Bailey, 1982; Bailey & Peterson, 1987), and divorce (Chamlin,
1989; Peterson & Bailey, 1988) have all been found to influence the odds of police
murder to some extent. It follows that these factors may be important indicators of
violence against police in general as well.
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Importance of the Current Study

Police violence is a difficult phenomenon to study because it is impossible to
ascertain the rate of prevention afforded by police actions and behaviors—there are
undoubtedly countless times when an officer does something that prevents an assault
on him or herself or others and never knows it—after all, officers are trained to keep
violence to a minimum whenever possible. While the body of research connecting
certain individual and social factors with police violence is growing, much more work is
needed as the body of previous research has, on the whole, suffered from some serious
deficiencies.
One of the main problems with studying violence against the police is the
availability and quality of data sources. The majority of studies thus far have relied on
official sources of data such as the FBI’s LEOKA dataset or NIBRS.

These data

sources are quite valuable in that they represent a broad set of cases from across the
US. However, they only provide limited types of information which have often been
funneled not only through the officers and then their agencies, but through an additional
federal government agency as well. Few studies (e.g. Bazley, Lersch, & Mieczkowski
2007; Fridell et al., 2009; Kaminski, Edwards, & Johnson, 1998) have relied on data
collected directly from police agencies, and although the data may be restricted to only
one geographical area, they may be more detailed or provide different types of
information than that available from nationwide sources, allowing researchers to study
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more varied facets of officer assaults.

The current study employed data collected

directly by the Orlando Police Department (OPD) for their own use. The data included
many variables of cases of violence against officers which would not be available from
any other source.
Another major problem with prior research on violence against officers is that the
majority of studies have examined only those cases of police assault which have ended
with the officer’s death. Minor assaults and those that result in minor injuries have been
largely ignored in existing literature although they are— thankfully— much more
common and it costs police agencies vast amounts of resources to handle these
incidents. Aside from the emotional costs to the officers themselves, agencies lose
resources on several other factors such as lost work time due to officer injuries, lost
work time for officers and their supervisors due to extra paperwork for the incident,
medical care for officers, and counseling for officers who have been assaulted. The
current study considered all reported batteries against Orlando Police Department
officers within a three-year period to facilitate learning about these more common minor
incidents.
A third and final problem with existing research is the lack of a consistent and
comprehensive theoretical background with which to frame the study of these incidents.
The current study will be the first to consider victim, offender, and incident
characteristics of the police assault as a criminal event. The use of the criminal events
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perspective along with social disorganization theory allows for the study of police
violence in a more comprehensive way than has previously been possible.

Research Questions

Based on findings from the above prior studies and the current study’s theoretical
framework, the following five research questions are advanced. Specific hypotheses of
the current study will be linked to each research question in the discussion of research
methods below in Chapter Three.
1. When are officer batteries most likely to occur?


Exact times are not agreed upon, but prior research does indicate that
hours of darkness are generally most dangerous for officers (Brandl,
1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2006; Meyer, et al., 1981). A compilation of the most
dangerous hours in these studies suggests that a timeframe of about
9:00 PM to 3:00 AM would be appropriate for analysis, especially
considering that many bars close for business at 2:00 AM.



According to a California Police Officer Standards and Training study
(2001), a study conducted by Chapman (1998), and the work of Meyer,
et al. (1981), weekends are more dangerous to police officers than
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weekdays. This may especially be true in the downtown bar district
and the tourist areas of the city where weekends often bring larger
crowds and increased alcohol consumption.


The work of Meyer, et al. (1981) indicates that police assaults are most
likely to occur during warmer, summer months. Uniform Crime Report
(UCR) data indicate that summer months are the most dangerous time
of year in general as well (FBI, 2004). Summer is also a high tourist
season in Orlando, when there is ample alcohol consumption and
crowds, leading to increased chances of disturbances of all types.

2. What types of calls are most likely to lead to officer battery?


Based on previous research, calls of a disturbance nature will more
often lead to officer battery and/or injury (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 1997), as will cases stemming from violent offenses,
cases with multiple officers involved (Garner & Maxwell, 2002), and
cases

with

Investigation,
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offenders
Federal
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Bureau

of

(Federal

Bureau

Investigation,

of

2006).

Furthermore, police injury will be more likely in cases in which personal
weapons are used by the offender (Kaminski & Sorensen, 1995), and
police battery will be more likely when no intermediate weapons (such
as oleoresin capsicum spray and/or Tasers) were used by the officer
(Kaminski, Edwards, & Johnson,1998; Smith, et al., 2007).
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3. What demographic characteristics of offenders most often lead to battery on
an officer in a use of force situation?


According to extant research, we expect that offenders who batter
officers will be most often young, non-white (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2007), and female (Engel, 2003).

We also expect

offenders of larger size and offenders with altered mental states (i.e.
perceived mental illness or intoxication) to batter officers more often
than other offenders (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006; Meyer, et
al., 1981; Stetzer, 2001).
4. What demographic characteristics of officers are more likely to lead to
battery?


Prior studies would lead us to expect that young officers, white officers,
and male officers will suffer battery most often (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1992).

5. In which areas of the City of Orlando is officer battery more prominent?


Incidents of officer battery are most likely to occur in areas of high
social disorganization because of a general attitude of disrespect for
formal law enforcement that is more predominant in these areas.
Officer batteries are also more likely to occur in areas where there are
large crowds of people together along with large amounts of alcohol
consumption because the combination of crowding and alcohol use is
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likely to lead to disturbances and fights. In Orlando, the areas of high
alcohol use would be the bar area of the downtown business district
and the tourism areas.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

The goals of the current study are twofold: (1) the study tests for empirical
support of the criminal events perspective as an explanation of violence against police,
and (2) the study determines factors which contribute to the likelihood of batteries
against police officers. As noted above, the variables tested can be divided into three
broad categories: situational or structural characteristics, offender characteristics, and
officer characteristics. The criminal events perspective as a framework for studying
violence against police is supported if at least one variable in all three categories is a
statistically significant predictor of police violence. These findings would indicate that
viewing police battery as an event with a beginning, middle, and end and taking into
account the entire social situation revolving around such incidents are necessary
strategies if we are to understand why these crimes occur.

Data

Data used in the current study are from the Orlando Police Department (OPD),
the municipal police agency of Orlando, Florida. OPD employs over 700 certified law
enforcement officers in patrol capacities throughout the city of Orlando, including patrol
vehicles, foot officers, horseback officers, and bicycle officers (City of Orlando, 2005).
OPD serves metropolitan Orlando, which has a population of 250,000 year-round city
37

residents. The greater Orlando area has over two million year-round residents (US
Census Bureau, 2007) and is the fourth largest metropolis in the southeastern United
States (City of Orlando, 2009).

The metro Orlando area is a major tourist destination

which attracted 48.7 million visitors in 2007 alone (Orlando/Orange County Convention
and Visitors Bureau, 2009), providing challenges for law enforcement that most areas
do not face. Besides being responsible for a large metropolitan city with the crime
problems that usually accompany growth, OPD must contend with the constant influx of
visitors who are generally unknown to the department and who create unique
challenges due to the heavy population density in popular tourist areas, especially the
overcrowded downtown bars and nightclubs and other places where both locals and
tourists gather en masse and where alcohol use is prevalent. These factors make
Orlando an unusually interesting city in which to study crime.
The current study utilized data of Orlando Police Department (see Appendix A)
that were collected internally by OPD for the agency’s own use.

OPD collects

information on every reported incident in which force is used by any of the agency’s
police officers. Every reported use of force is recorded on these forms regardless of
whether the incident resulted in injury to any party or even the eventual arrest of the
subject on which force was used. For the purposes of the data collection, use of force
may have involved the deployment of weapons by officers, but also simply the use of
hands or bodies to control a suspect. The forms include: the time, date, and location of
the incident (some incidents occurred outside city limits but involved City of Orlando
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police officers), the original reason for the incident or call, any offenses for which the
subject of the force was later charged, counts and demographic information on all
offenders, OPD employees, and any known witnesses, information on all weapons
used, a narrative of the incident written by the principal officer’s supervisor, and whether
or not the use of force was cleared by supervisors as appropriate and within agency
guidelines. Also included is the number of OPD officers who were battered and/or
injured from the incident, if any2. It is important to note that in Florida, there is a legal
distinction drawn between assaults, which can be verbal or involve the threat (but not
actual use) of physical violence, and batteries, in which actual physical contact takes
place. The OPD use of force forms indicate the number of officers battered. This
allowed for a comparison between cases in which no officers were battered and cases
that led to the physical battery of at least one officer.
The use of force forms were provided for use in the current study although they
contain sensitive information that is not available to the public. For this reason, the
study proposal was thoroughly reviewed and approved by the University of Central
Florida’s Institutional Review Board (see Appendix C). The files available represent
three years of data from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2008. However, the
file for March 2008 could not be located at the time of data collection; therefore, the
entire dataset represents a total of 35 months of cases rather than 36. All incidents
reported will be included in the current study, so no sampling procedure will be required.
2

A copy of the Orlando Police Department’s use of force policy, including the described form, can be
found in Appendix B.
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The complete dataset contains 1,812 cases in which force was used by one or more
officers for the three year total. This includes 391 cases in which a total of 457 officers
were battered and 173 cases in which 216 officers were injured. All case information
was taken from hard copies of the forms and put directly into an SPSS database for
analysis.
It is important for our evolving knowledge of violence against the police to use
different forms of data than the traditional official reports to the Uniform Crime Reporting
system, and the current study assisted in this growth. However, as with any dataset,
there were potential threats to validity and reliability that should be considered
throughout the study methodology and subsequent interpretation of results. First, the
information on the use of force forms was reported by the principally-involved officer’s
direct supervisor. As with any time that data are reported by several different people,
there may have been conflicts in the way the data are reported. For example, the form
asks for all physical tactics used by officers during the incident; some supervisors
interpret this as weapons other than body parts, some include hands, knees, etc. only if
they were used to strike, and some supervisors include any instance that an officer laid
hands on a suspect, even if it were only to apply handcuffs. Therefore, in the current
study, only intermediate weapons (i.e. Tasers) were tested for significance. Personal
weapons (i.e. body parts) were not tested due to the ambiguity in the data.
Another methodological issue that should be considered relates to the reporting
of injuries to officers. While some supervisors reported even the most minor of injuries,
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others may have reported only more serious injuries.

Furthermore, the traditional

bravado associated with police officers may have led some officers not to report minor
injuries, such as small scrapes or muscle soreness, at all. This undoubtedly led to an
underreporting of officer injuries, although the extent of this problem is unknown.
However, unreported injuries were almost certainly minor; we can be assured that any
moderate or serious injury would generally have to be reported either because medical
treatment was required or because there was blood-to-blood contact between the
offender and the officer which had to be addressed for officer safety reasons.
A third methodological concern lies in the reporting of the races of the offenders
and officers. Most supervisors reported race as either black, white, Hispanic, Asian, or
other. Very few reports included whether an actor was white or black and whether he or
she was Hispanic. Therefore, for purposes of uniformity in the data and their analysis,
race in the dataset was reported simply as white, black, Hispanic, or other3; there was
no separate distinction between white or black non-Latinos and white or black Latinos.
The fourth and final methodological issue to be aware of is temporal. Policecitizen interactions are complex and involve a large amount of perception on both sides.
In some cases, offense may have been taken by the officer first, while in other cases
offense might have been taken by the offender first. While all of these cases involved
force by the police and some involved violence by the suspect, there was no reliable
method to determine how the incident actually started, or more importantly which actor
3

Asians were included in the other category because there were too few Asian officers and suspects to
form a separate category.
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made the first move. The reader should be aware that because of data limitations, the
analyses in the current study were incapable of addressing this temporal issue.

Analysis

Phase One: Descriptive Statistics

After testing for outliers, multicollinearity issues, and high levels of correlation
between potential variables, three phases of analysis were conducted4. Phase one
included an examination of the data collected on the incidences of violence against
Orlando officers. Because these data had never been previously studied, they were
first examined thoroughly through the use of descriptive statistics to fully understand the
characteristics therein. This helped promote understanding of the general trends in the
data and ensured that the data were clean for further analysis.

Phase Two: Logistic Regression

Phase two of the analysis employed inferential statistics to examine possible
connections between officer battery and personal characteristics of the victims and

4

There were no multicollinearity problems detected and no variables were highly correlated.
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offenders as well as situational characteristics. This phase utilized logistic regression5
in order to determine the statistical significance of several different factors related to
police violence. Three models were employed during this phase of analysis. The first
model included situational independent variables only, the second model added in
offender characteristics, and the third model tested officer characteristics in addition to
the variables of the first two models. The dependent variable for all three models was a
dummy variable indicating whether or not a use of force incident led to a battery on one
or more officers (where 0= use of force with no officer battery and 1= use of force with
officer battery).
The independent variables for the first logistic regression model tested the
relevance of situational factors for each incident. Independent variables included Taser
use, time of day, season, the nature of the original call or officer-initiated contact,
whether or not there were single or multiple officers and offenders on scene, and the
number of businesses licensed to sell alcohol within a ½ mile radius of the incident
location. Model Two added in variables to test characteristics of the primary offender,
including race, age, gender, size/body composition (measured by BMI), and whether or
not the offender was known to have recently consumed alcohol before the incident. The
third and final model added in characteristics of the primary officer, including race, age,
and gender.

5

Logistic regression was used as opposed to linear regression because the dependent variable was
dichotomous.
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The logistic regression models were designed to test several hypotheses that
were directly related to the first four of the five research questions listed above.
1. When were officer batteries most likely to occur?
a. Officer batteries were more likely to occur between 9:00 PM and
3:00 AM.
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur on Friday, Saturday, and
Sunday.
c. Officer batteries were more likely to occur during June, July, and
August.
2. What types of calls were most likely to lead to officer battery?
a. Officer batteries were less likely to occur when Tasers were used.
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the original reason
for the officer/suspect interaction was a violent crime (i.e. involved
assault and/or battery, attempted murder, etc).
c. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when multiple officers
were on scene.
d. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when multiple offenders
were on scene.
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e. Officer batteries were more likely to occur in areas within ½ mile of
a large number of businesses that are licensed to sell alcohol6.
3. What demographic characteristics of offenders most often led to battery on an
officer in a use of force situation?
a. Officer batteries were less likely to occur when the suspect was
white.
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the suspect was
young.
c. Officer batteries were less likely to occur when the suspect was
male.
d. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the suspect had a
higher BMI.
e. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the suspect was
known to have recently consumed alcohol.
4. What demographic characteristics of officers were more likely to lead to
battery?
a. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the officer was
white.
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur to younger officers.
c. Officer batteries were more likely to occur to male officers.
6

The number of businesses licensed to sell alcohol within ½ mile was derived from a ½ mile buffer
around all incidents created in ArcGIS.
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Phase Three: Spatial Analyses

The third phase of analysis employed crime analysis techniques through the use
of two geographic mapping and analysis software programs: ESRI’s ArcGIS suite
(ESRI, 2008) and NIJ’s CrimeStat program, which is a statistics program that aids in the
analysis of crime locations (Ned Levine and Associates, 2009).

Phase Three was

designed to examine the geographical characteristics of the incidents as compared to
areas of social disorganization and alcohol use; this provided a test of the importance of
space and time to the occurrence of police battery. First, maps were created to visually
examine the locations of use of force incidents in general and use of force incidents that
resulted in officer batteries. The base map layer of Orlando streets was obtained from
ESRI’s website (www. esri.com), where current map layers of Orlando city limits,
streets, and neighborhoods are available for public use. Using this source ensured that
the street layer was as up to date as possible. Census tract layers were obtained from
the US Census Bureau website. All other map layers, which contained information
about the battery incidents against officers, were created by the author directly from the
OPD data.
Next, spatial analyses were conducted to determine whether there were
statistically significant clusters of any of the above types of incidents. Because each
type of spatial analysis tests for connections in different ways, it was crucial to use more
than one type of analysis. Using multiple analyses to test for clusters allows for the
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testing of both point and aggregate data, and the analyses vary in statistical robustness.
If a simple analysis is run with positive results, there is impetus to run more advanced
analyses.
In the current study, three analyses were run to test for spatial clustering. First, a
chloropleth map7 of officer batteries by count was created to visually test for incident
clustering at the census tract level. Second, two nearest neighbor analyses were run.
The nearest neighbor analysis tests for statistically significant clustering and returns an
index value which tells the researcher whether clustering exists and the strength of the
clustering.

The single-order nearest neighbor index is a measure of how close,

geographically, each incident is to the next closest incident; the k-order nearest
neighbor index is a measure of how close each incident is to the next closest incident,
then the next and the next to the kth incident. The index value returned states whether
or not the incidents are closer than what would have been expected to occur by chance
(Paulsen & Robinson, 2009).
The nearest neighbor analysis is a robust test of clustering, but does not describe
where the clustering occurred. Therefore, a third spatial analysis was run—a quartic
kernel density interpolation. Kernel density interpolation places a fine grid over the
entire study area, then measures the distance from the center of each grid square to the
incident locations (Paynich & Hill, 2010). This provides a continuous layer over the

7

Chloropleth maps use varied colors to indicate intensity of a variable in each area under study. In this
case, for example, each census tract was shaded so that darker tracts indicated a higher number of
incidents occurring in that tract.
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study area that indicates clustering or lack of clustering in all areas. The quartic type of
interpolation was chosen because it is the most appropriate for mapping crime incident
locations (Eck, Chainey, Cameron, Leitner, & Wilson, 2005). This is because crime
locations are not continuous—in other words, no incidents occur “between” incidents.
Upon determining the extent and location of officer battery clusters, analyses
were conducted in attempts to explore why there were clusters in these areas. To test
for a relationship with social disorganization factors, a social disorganization scale was
created using data from the US Census Bureau’s 2000 data collection 8. Six social
disorganization

variables

were

considered,

including:

population

heterogeneity

(measured by % white), education level (measured by the percentage of the population
age 25 and older who received less than a high school education), unemployment
levels (measured by the percentage of the population age 16 and older who were
unemployed), poverty level (measured by the percentage of households on public
assistance and the percentage of families whose income was below the poverty level),
housing stability/mobility (measured by the percentage of renter-occupied housing units
and the percentage of vacant housing units), and family composition (measured by the
percentage of female-headed households).
A scale was developed to measure social disorganization by census tract, and
each tract was assigned a score from zero to six which indicated the number of social
8

The 2000 Census was the most recent source for obtaining all of the data needed at the tract level
rather than the city level. A comparison between 2000 Census data for Orlando City and 2006-2008 3year estimates from the American Communities Survey for Orlando City did indicate some changes over
the past few years, although most were minor. For more information on the estimated differences
between the 2000 and 2006-2008 data, see Appendix D.

48

disorganization variables for which the tract was above average; higher scores indicated
higher levels of disorganization.

A chloropleth map was then created of social

disorganization levels by census tract that could be compared to officer battery counts
by census tract. This allowed for an investigation of the potential linkages between
areas with high levels of officer violence and areas with high levels of social
disorganization.
Another exploration into why officer batteries were more prevalent in certain
areas revolved around alcohol use and crowding situations.

A list of all current

businesses in Orlando that hold licenses to sell alcohol was obtained from the State of
Florida’s Department of Business and Professional Regulation. These locations were
mapped and compared to the clusters of officer battery incidents to determine the extent
of overlap.

Furthermore, alcohol license locations were also mapped by type (on

premises consumption such as bars and clubs vs. off premises consumption such as
liquor stores) to examine any differences therein.
These spatial analyses were designed specifically to test hypotheses related to
the fifth research question:
5. In which areas of the city of Orlando was officer battery more prominent?
a. Officer batteries were more likely to occur in areas of high social
disorganization.
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur in areas of high alcohol
use.
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The first step in determining the characteristics and causes of officer battery in
Orlando, as described above, was to examine the data set in detail. In Chapter Four:
Descriptive Statistics, the frequency and characteristics of officer battery incidents are
discussed. The regression analyses that comprise the second phase of analysis are
discussed in Chapter Five: Regression Analyses, and in Chapter Six: Spatial Analyses,
all of the spatial tests and results are provided.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The first stage of analysis involved using descriptive statistics to examine the
data in detail. Between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008, there were 1,812
reported use of force incidents by police in the city of Orlando. Of those 1,812
incidents, 391 (21.58%) involved battery against at least one law enforcement officer
employed by Orlando Police Department, and 173 cases (9.54%) involved the injury of
at least one OPD officer. Six-hundred twenty-eight use of force cases occurred in 2006,
629 occurred in 2007, and 554 occurred in 2008 (although, as noted above, the file for
the March 2008 cases could not be located at the time of data collection). There was
no significant difference in the frequency of incidents by year. Of the incidents involving
battery against an officer or officers, 140 occurred in 2006, 153 occurred in 2007, and
98 occurred in 2008. Twenty-four officer battery cases occurred in January, 34
occurred in February, 28 occurred in March, 40 occurred in April, 36 occurred in May,
38 occurred in June, 25 occurred in July, 32 occurred in August, 32 occurred in
September, 38 occurred in October, 31 occurred in November, and 33 occurred in
December. There appeared to be little difference by seasonality, which is logical
because the semi-tropical climate in Orlando does not allow for the defined seasons
that are found in other areas of the country. For a further breakdown of year and month
of incidents, refer to Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Officer Battery by Month and Year

NOTE: The main file for March 2008 incidents was missing at the time of data
collection.
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In 27 cases, battery against an officer or officers occurred on a Monday, 45
cases occurred on Tuesdays, 50 occurred on Wednesdays, 47 occurred on Thursdays,
60 occurred on Fridays, 79 occurred on Saturdays, and 83 cases occurred on Sundays
(see Figure 4). Although prior research has not found a significant pattern of officer
assault by day of the week, this is consistent with FBI reports (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2009) indicating that the murder of police officers occurs most frequently
during the weekend days. As for the time of day in which the incidents occurred, thirtyone cases occurred during the earlier part of the day, from 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM. Eightytwo cases occurred from 3:00 PM through 9:00 PM, 235 cases occurred between 9:00
PM and 3:00 AM, and 43 cases occurred between 3:00 AM and 9:00 AM (see Figure 5).
While prior studies have not reached a consensus on the specific times that are most
dangerous to officers, this finding is consistent in that the most dangerous times in
general are times of darkness (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997;
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006).

Victim Characteristics

The 391 battery incidents involved 620 individual officer victims. The victims
were overwhelmingly male (563 male victims, or 91%) (see Figure 6), to a slightly larger
degree than the breakdown of the total officer population, which is 84% male and 16%
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Figure 5: Officer Battery by Time of Day
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female. The victim officers were predominantly white (72%), while 16% were black, 6%
were Hispanic, 1% were Asian, and 2% were of other races. In 17 instances (3%), race
information was missing (see Figure 7).
As compared to the general officer population, it appears that white officers are
overrepresented among those battered, while Hispanic officers are underrepresented.
Sixty-two percent of the total officer population at OPD is white, 18% is black, 16% is
Hispanic, 3% is Asian, and about 1% if comprised of other ethnicities. About 8% of
officers were age 25 or younger (n=50), while 44% were between 26 and 34 years of
age (n=269), 44% were between 35 and 49 years of age (n=270), 2% were between 50
and 64 years of age (n=14), and 3% were age 65 or older (n=17) (see Figure 8). Officer
ages ranged from 22 to 56 years at the time of the battery incident, with an average
officer age of about 34.4 years. The officer demographic information was in general
agreement with the findings of prior research.

Offender Characteristics

In the 391 battery incidents, there were 425 individual offenders. The offenders
were also predominantly male (85%), but not to the same extent as the victims (Figure
6). Racial makeup of the offenders was strikingly different than that of the victims, with
43% white, 43% black, 11% Hispanic, and 1% each of Asian and of other descent (4
offenders, or about 1%, were missing race information) (Figure 7). This is generally in
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line with the previously discussed prior studies in the area.

Offenders were also

younger than victim officers on the whole, with 6% age 17 or younger, 38% between 18
and 25 years of age, 30% between 26 and 34 years of age, 18% between 35 and 49,
4% between 50 and 64, and 1% age 65 or older (16 offenders, or 4%, were missing this
information). Offenders were over five years younger than officers on the whole, with a
range spanning 65 years (from 10 years to 75 years old) (Figure 8) and an average of
about 28.9 years.

Of course, some of this difference in age between victim and

offender may occur because officers must be at least 21 years of age before being
employed in law enforcement while there is no minimum age for offenders. The heights
of offenders ranged from 4 feet and 4 inches to 6 feet and 5 inches with an average of
about 5 feet 9 inches. Offender weights ranged from 90 pounds to 390 pounds with an
average of about 181 pounds.
Offenders were not only from the state of Florida, but also many other states in
the US as well as outside the US. Of the 425 offenders, 339 resided in Florida, 30 lived
elsewhere in the US, and 1 was visiting from a foreign country. Another 28 offenders
were transient, and for 27 offenders the residence was unknown, usually because the
offender refused to answer or in a few cases because the offender had fled and not
been found at the time of the report. For a breakdown of the counties in which the
Florida suspects lived at the time of the incident, see Figure 9.
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58

60

70

80

1
4
18
Suspects
30
38
6

% 65 and older
% 50-64
% 35-49
% 26-34

3

% 18-25
% 0-17

2
44
Officers
44
8
0

0

10

20

30

40

50

Figure 8: Age of Officers and Suspects

NOTE: Citizens are not eligible to be employed as law enforcement officers until the age
of 21 years.
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At the time of the incidents, several suspects were known to have altered mental
conditions or prior injuries of some sort. The most common type of altered condition by
far was alcohol use. One-hundred ninety offenders (45%) were known to be under the
influence of alcohol, while another 39 offenders (9%) were known to be under the
influence of some other type of substance such as narcotics or, occasionally, prescribed
medication. This category also includes those offenders who had purposefully ingested
narcotics in an attempt to avoid their detection.

This finding was to be expected

according to prior studies in which a large percentage of offenders had recently
consumed alcohol and/or illegal drugs at the time of the incident in question (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2006; Stetzer, 2001).
Considering other types of altered conditions, thirty-three offenders (8%) were
known to have had prior injuries before the incident (either because they were observed
by the officers or because the suspect verbally expressed this), and 6 offenders (1%)
were known to be mentally ill. Eight offenders (2%) had other prior conditions that
affected the incident, such as being elderly, and for the other 149 offenders no prior
condition was known (although this does not mean that none of the above conditions
existed in these cases) (see Figure 10).
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Figure 9: Florida Resident Suspects by County
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Figure 10: Known Prior Conditions Affecting Suspects at Time of Incident
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Ratio of Officers to Offenders

Another important characteristic to examine is the ratio of suspects to officers. In
about 43% of cases (n=169), the incidents involved one suspect and one officer. This is
in line with prior studies that indicate that single officers and single offenders represent
the most common breakdown of actors in officer violence scenarios (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006). In just over 3% of cases in
the current study (n=13), the number involved was also even, with two suspects and two
officers. About 29% of cases (n=115) involved one suspect and two officers, and about
13% of cases (n=49) involved one suspect and three officers. Smaller proportions of
cases involved one suspect and more than three officers (4% or 16 cases for 4 officers,
2% or 7 cases for 5 officers, and 1% or 3 cases for 6 officers). There were other cases
in which officers outnumbered suspects but these incidents were less frequent. About
2% of cases (n=8) involved two suspects and three officers, one case involved two
suspects and five officers, and one case involved three suspects and four officers.
There were also a few cases that involved multiple suspects against one officer,
but this circumstance was much rarer, possibly because officers work in pairs or groups
as often as they possibly can for safety purposes.

Less than 2% of cases (n=6)

involved one officer and two suspects and in one case there were two officers and four
suspects. For a general breakdown of the ratio of officers to suspects, see Figure 11.
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Weapon Use and Injuries

Because the Orlando Police Department collects these data to examine their use
of force incidents, there is detailed information available for weapon use by the officers
but not for the offenders. Personal weapons (i.e. body parts) were by far the weapons
of choice by officers. Officers or supervisors reported the use of hands or other body
parts either for control of the situation or as weapons in 275 of the 391 cases (about
70%). In 250 of those cases, more detailed information was available as follows: in 103
cases (41%) in which personal weapons were used, hands were used for escort or
control only, in 70 cases (28%) bodily pressure points were used to gain compliance, in
48 cases (19%) officers initiated takedowns or tackles of some type, in 3 cases (1%)
officers utilized open hand strikes, knee strikes, or elbow strikes, and in 25 cases (10%)
officers used closed fist strikes or kicks to gain control (see Figure 12).
The next most frequent weapon used by officers was by far the Taser. Tasers
were used in half of all use of force incidents (n=196). Chemical sprays (such as
oleoresin capsicum or pepper spray) were used about in about a quarter of the cases
(24% or 95 cases), and impact weapons (such as asp batons) were used in about 14%
(n=54) of cases.

In 9 cases (about 2%) canine police units were deployed.

It is

important to note that these weapon categories are not mutually exclusive—more than
one type of weapon could have been used in each incident (Figure 13).
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Firearms were not listed as a weapon category for officers on the use of force
forms because officer-involved shootings require a separate and more in-depth
investigation. According to the Internal Affairs Unit at OPD, however, firearms were
discharged in only 14 cases between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008.
Weapon use by both the officers and the suspects led to several injuries on both
sides. During the course of the 391 incidents in which officers were battered, 137 of the
620 (22%) involved officers reported receiving injuries. Among the injured officers, 58
(42%) reported receiving abrasions or cuts, 23 (17%) reported bruising and redness, 30
(22%) reported muscle or joint injuries, 2 (1%) reported broken bones or possible
broken bones, and 19 (14%) officers reported head, neck, or back injuries.

Eight

officers (6%) also suffered significant exposure to another’s blood, a potentially
dangerous or even fatal incident (Figure 14).
A much larger percentage of suspects than officers were injured in the incidents,
although most of the injuries (as with the victim officers) were minor. A total of 299
suspects of the involved 425 (about 70%) reported injuries. Of the injured suspects, a
quarter (n=76) reported only minor Taser marks (from prongs or direct contact) and
another 5% (n=14) reported only eye irritation from chemical sprays such as oleoresin
capsicum. Three percent (n=10) received bites from police dogs (not including bites to
the face or head which were categorized more seriously). About 17% (n=50) of
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suspects received other types of minor injuries such as scrapes or bruises, while about
40% (n=121) reported intermediate level injuries such as sprains, larger cuts, or minor
facial injuries. Finally, about 9% (n=28) of the injured offenders reported receiving more
serious injuries such as larger facial injuries, head injuries, or broken bones (see Figure
15).

One-hundred eighty-nine (63%) of the injured offenders sought some level of

medical treatment for their injuries.

Incident Types and Charges

The types of incidents that led to the altercation in which officers were battered were
quite varied.

The incident types were generally in line with prior literature in that

batteries resulting from disturbances and other types of public order issues were quite
common (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997). The most common type
of incident, which occurred in over a quarter of cases (27.6% or n=108), was public
order crime such as public intoxication. The next most prominent offense for which
officers were called, which occurred in 13.3% of cases or 52 incidents, was violence
against a law enforcement officer or emergency personnel. These were often cases in
which the officers who were battered responded to assist other officers or other
emergency personnel such as paramedics or firefighters. Twelve percent of cases
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(n=47) were initiated because of some type of general disturbance or fight, and another
12% (n=47) were initiated for traffic incidents such as traffic stops, crashes, or DUIs.
Simple assault and battery cases and drug or alcohol offenses accounted for 6.9%
(n=27) of cases each, while domestic violence related cases accounted for 4.1% (n=16)
of incidents.
Other serious violent crimes accounted for 3.8% or 15 cases. Property crimes
and attempted property crimes accounted for 3.3% of cases (n=13), while warrant
service and backups for other agencies accounted for 1.3% (n=12) each. One percent
of the cases or less were initiated by: obstruction of an investigation or interference with
the duty of law enforcement officers (n=4), “man down” calls or calls to check well-being
(n=3), attempted suicides (n=3), mentally ill persons or Baker Act cases (cases in which
the suspect was taken into custody for involuntary mental evaluation) (n=2), and fleeing
and eluding or escaped prisoners (n=2). There was one incident each of a sex crime
with a victim (i.e. not prostitution, etc.), a weapons offense, and an alarm call. In 3.1%
of cases (n=12) the initial reason for the interaction between officer and suspect was
unclear from the data provided (for a breakdown of all incident types, see Figure 16).
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Most suspects faced multiple charges stemming from these officer battery
incidents with the most common type of charge by far resulting from the battery on the
officer(s) itself. In 9 out of 10 incidents (n=349), suspects were charged with resisting
an officer with violence and/or assault or battery on a law enforcement officer.

In

another seven percent of cases (n=28), suspects were charged with resisting an officer
without violence.
Charges not relating to resisting or battering officers often provided the reason
behind the initial interaction between officer and suspect.

In order to simplify

understanding of these situations, these charges were categorized according to the type
of incident and then ranked by seriousness. In other words, if a suspect was charged
with a violent crime and a property crime, the case was categorized with violent crimes
because the most serious offense resulting from the case was a violent crime. The
charges related to the incidents break down as follows: 51 incidents (13%) involved
violent crime charges and another 12 incidents (3.1%) involved depriving an officer of
his or her means of communication; 9 other incidents (2.3%) involved charges for
disobeying a law enforcement officer, fleeing, or providing false information to a law
enforcement officer; 31 cases (7.9%) involved drug charges and 11 cases (2.8%)
involved property crimes, while another 11 cases (2.8%) involved traffic offenses and 2
cases (0.5%) involved the service of warrants that had been issued prior to the incident.
Seventy-seven cases (19.7%) involved public order offenses or the violation of city
ordinances, such as public intoxication or panhandling. Nearly half of the cases (47.6%
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or n=186) did not result in any charges other than those of resisting or battering an
officer (for a breakdown of charges, see Figure 17 below).
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While examining the data in detail is essential, this type of descriptive analysis
cannot indicate the correlations or predictive value between officer battery and
situational factors regarding the officers, suspects, and incidents. The next chapter,
Chapter Five, covers logistic regression analyses that test the relationships between
many situational factors and battery against officers. Then, Chapter Six includes spatial
analyses of the geographical areas in which officer batteries most often occurred.
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CHAPTER FIVE: REGRESSION ANALYSES

After the detailed description of the data from Orlando Police Department that
was discussed in Chapter Four above, regression models were estimated to test the
potential situational and individual-level factors that might lead to battery against
officers. Because the dependent variable (officer battery vs. no battery) was
dichotomous, logistic regression was the most appropriate choice for the analysis.
Independent variables were grouped into three blocks, with the first block containing
situational factors, the second block containing characteristics of the primary offender,
and the third block describing the primary officer involved.

Independent Variables

The first block of analysis, which contained situational factors, was comprised of
eight independent variables. TIME93A was a dummy variable indicating that the
incident occurred between the hours of 9:00PM and 3:00AM rather than during other
times of the day (1=9PM to 3AM, 0=all other times). WEEKEND3 described whether or
not the incident occurred during the weekend (Friday, Saturday or Sunday) or during the
week (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday) (1=weekend, 0=weekday).
SUMMER referred to whether the incident occurred during the summer months of June,
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July, or August rather than during another season (1=summer, 0=other seasons).
DTTASER was created as a dummy variable to indicate whether or not officers used
Tasers as intermediate weapons during the use of force incident (1=taser use, 0=no
taser use). VIOLENT refers to the type of incident that the officers were originally
handling when the use of force occurred, including both officer-initiated incidents and
calls for service. This variable was created as a dummy variable indicating violent
incident types as opposed to other incident types such as property crimes or public
order crimes (1=violent incident, 0=other types of incidents). NUMEMPL and
NUMOFND refer to whether or not the incident involved single or multiple officers and
single or multiple offenders, respectively (1=multiple officers, 0=single officer; 1=multiple
offenders, 0=single offender).
Finally, NUMALCLIC refers to a count of businesses licensed to sell alcohol
within ½ mile of the incident location (continuous variable). This variable was of high
interest because of its potential substantive value, but there was a substantial portion of
cases missing that had to be dealt with before the variable could be used. Because this
variable was created by placing a ½ mile buffer around each incident location to obtain
a count of the alcohol-related businesses within the area, the data relied on incidents
that could be mapped. Many incidents could not be mapped either because the
incidents actually occurred outside of the city limits or because there were errors in the
address of the incident location. Consequently, using this variable led to a loss of 742
cases (nearly 41%), a rather large portion. Obviously, this caused concern that bias
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might become an issue. A dummy variable was created to measure whether or not this
issue created a significant difference in the overall model. A value of “1” indicated that
the case involved the mean number of alcohol-related businesses in close proximity
(14), while “0” indicated other values. This variable was not found to be significant,
indicating that the loss of cases because of the mapping issues did not pose a major
issue for the validity of the regression results. Therefore, the variable for the number of
alcohol-related businesses within ½ mile of each incident was included in the analysis,
but mean substitution was used to keep bias from the variable to a minimum9.
The second block of independent variables added in five characteristics of the
primary offender. OFF1WHT referred to the race of the primary offender (1=white,
0=non-white), OFF1_AGE referred to the age of the primary offender (continuous
variable), and OFF1_SEX referred to the gender of the primary offender (1=male,
0=female). OFF_BMI was a continuous variable referring to the primary offender’s body
mass index, and OFF1ALC referred to whether or not the offender was perceived to
have been under the influence of alcohol at the time the incident occurred (1=alcohol
use, 0=no alcohol use).
The third block added in independent variables that described characteristics of
the primary officer involved. EMPL1WHT referred to the primary officer’s race (1=white,
0=non-white). EMPL1AGE referred to the primary officer’s age (continuous variable),
9

The models were run both with and without the NUMALCLIC variable, and also with the NUMALCLIC
variable with mean substitution employed for the missing values. There were few differences between
the significant factors in each model. The one potentially important difference was that the number of
offenders was a significant predictor of battery in earlier models and this effect disappeared in the final
model which used mean substitution.
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and EMPL1SX referred to the officer’s gender (1=male, 0=female). For a complete
review of the variables involved in the logistic regression models, see Table 1 below.

Table 1: Description of Variables in Logistic Regression Models

Variable Name
DUMMY_DV (dependent
variable)
TIME93A
WEEKEND3
SUMMER
DTTASER
VIOLENT
NUMEMPL
NUMOFND
MSFORALCLIC

OFF1WHT
OFF1_AGE
OFF1_SEX
OFF_BMI
OFF1ALC
EMPL1WHT
EMPL1AGE
EMPL1SX

Measurement
1=officer battery, 0=no officer battery
1=9:00PM to 3:00AM, 0=all other times
1=Friday, Saturday or Sunday, 0=Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday or Thursday
1=June, July or August, 0=other months
1=taser used, 0= no taser used
1=violent original incident/call, 0=other types of original
incidents
1=multiple officers, 0=single officer
1=multiple offenders, 0=single offender
Continuous variable, count of the number of businesses
licensed to sell alcohol within ½ mile of the incident
location (with mean substitution for missing cases)
1=white offender, 0=non-white offender
Continuous variable, age of offender in years
1=male offender, 0=female offender
Continuous variable of offender body mass index (BMI)
1=offender had consumed alcohol, 0=offender was not
known to have consumed alcohol
1=white officer, 0=non-white officer
Continuous variable, age of officer in years
1=male officer, 0=female officer
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Results

The results of the regression models (found in Table 2 below) indicated that
several variables were significant indicators of officer battery. Overall, the first model,
which contained only the situational independent variables, was highly significant
(p=.000, Chi-Square=45.568, df=8) but only explained about 4.1% (Nagelkerke=.041) of
the variance among use of force cases that involved officer battery and use of force
cases that did not involve officer battery. In this model, two variables were significant.
The odds of battery for incidents involving multiple officers were actually 94.2% higher
than incidents involving a single officer (odds ratio=1.942, p<.001)10. Model One results
also indicated that the odds of battery for incidents occurring in areas where there were
higher numbers of businesses licensed to sell alcohol were slightly higher (odds
ratio=1.008, p<.05), but this effect was not found in subsequent models.
Model two included the situational variables, but added in characteristics of the
primary offender as well; this model was also highly significant (p=.000, ChiSquare=81.272, df=13) although overall it explained only 7.3% of the variance between
cases involving officer battery and cases that did not (Nagelkerke=.073). When
offender characteristics were included, the number of alcohol-related businesses was
not significant, but the number of officers involved remained an important contributor to

10

In cases of field training, which may last between 4 ½ and 8 months, two officers are in each patrol
vehicle. Also, when personnel are available, officers “double up” in the City’s more active districts.
Otherwise, it is Orlando Police Department policy for officers to ride one per patrol vehicle.
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officer battery situations with little change in odds ratio or significance. The odds of
battery among cases with multiple officers were 92.2% higher than cases with single
officers (odds ratio=1.922, p<.001).
In Model Two, there were three new significant variables as well, including the
gender of the offender, the weight of the offender, and whether or not the offender was
known to have recently consumed alcohol before the incident. The odds of battery in
cases involving male primary offenders were actually 56.1% lower than cases involving
female primary offenders (odds ratio=.439, p<.001). Among cases involving offenders
with higher BMI, the odds of battery were also slightly higher (odds ratio=1.045, p<.01).
Furthermore, the odds of battery for cases in which the primary offender was known to
have recently consumed alcohol were about 39.8% higher than those in which the
offender was not known to have recently consumed alcohol (odds ratio=1.398, p<.05).
Model Three included all of the above factors and also included some basic
demographic characteristics of the primary officers involved, including race, age, and
gender. The full model remained highly significant overall (p=.000, Chi-Square=82.983,
df=16), but explained only about 7.4% of the variance between use of force cases that
involved officer battery and those cases that did not (Nagelkerke=.074). In this model,
all of the factors that had previously been significant in Model Two remained significant.
Cases involving multiple officers resulted in 91.6% higher odds of battery (odds
ratio=1.916, p<.001). Odds of battery in cases involving male offenders were about
54.8% lower than those with female offenders (odds ratio=.452, p<.001), and incidents
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with offenders with higher BMI had very slightly lower odds of officer battery (odds
ratio=1.045, p<.01). Incidents involving offenders who had recently consumed alcohol
also remained a significant factor; the odds of these incidents involving officer battery
were about 40.8% higher than incidents in which the offender was not known to have
recently consumed alcohol (odds ratio=1.408, p<.05). However, none of the newly
added independent variables which contained officer demographic information were
significant indicators of officer battery. See Table 2 for results of all three regression
models; see Appendix E for full regression output from SPSS.

Discussion

While most of the results of the logistic regression models were expected, a few
findings were surprising. The full model containing all sixteen independent variables
only explained about 7.4% of the variation between use of force cases involving officer
battery and use of force cases in which no officer battery was reported. This seems
low, but then again there is very little to compare this result to as violence against
officers has not often been studied with this method in prior research. Garner and
Maxwell’s (2002) study of police use of force and suspect resistance used logistic
regression to determine predictors of both police force and suspect resistance,
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9PM – 3AM
Weekend
Summer
Taser Use
Violent Call
Multiple
Officers
Multiple
Offenders
AlcoholLicensed
Businesses
White
Offender
Offender
Age
Male
Offender
Offender
BMI
Offender
Consumed
Alcohol
White Officer
Officer Age
Male Officer
Step ChiSquare
Model ChiSquare
Degrees of
Freedom
Nagelkerke
R-Square

Model 1
B
.179
.068
-.139
.058
-.146
.663

SE
.125
.123
.142
.121
.167
.121

Model 2
Model 3
Exp (b)
B
SE
Exp (b)
B
SE
Exp (b)
1.196
.095 .132
1.099
.097 .133
1.101
1.071
-.022 .126
.978
-.016 .126
.984
.870
-.146 .143
.865
-.146 .143
.864
1.060
.132 .127
1.141
.120 .127
1.128
.764
-.171 .170
.843
-.171 .170
.843
1.942*** .653 .123 1.922*** -.650 .123 1.916***

.327

.233

1.387

.276

.241

1.318

.289

.242

1.335

.008

.003

1.008*

.007

.003

1.007

.007

.003

1.007

.151

.137

1.163

.154

.137

1.166

-.004

.006

.996

-.006

.006

.994

-.822

.201

.439***

-.794

.203

.452***

.044

.013

1.045**

.044

.013

1.045**

.335

.144

1.398*

.342

.144

1.408*

45.568***

35.704***

-.030 .141
-.006 .009
-.332 .284
1.711

45.568***

81.272***

82.983***

13

16

8
.041

.073

.074

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results—Dependent Variable is Officer Battery (1) vs. No Officer Battery (0)

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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.971
.994
.717

and they found that only nine of the forty-one independent variables examined had a
consistent, significant effect on whether or not force was used. Even in this inclusive,
methodologically sound study, two-thirds of the variation in police use of force remained
unexplained (Garner & Maxwell, 2002).
Obviously, there are factors at work here that the current regression models do
not capture. This in itself should not be a surprise considering that all police-citizen
interactions involve a high degree of perception on both sides. Officers or offenders
may perceive a look or an aggressive stance that is not measured here, and take this as
offensive. The information available when a call for service comes to the officer is often
skewed if one of the involved parties is the person who calls for help, and this may
affect the officer’s perception of the incident (and the aggression levels of those
involved) before he or she even arrives on scene. Incidents that occur among crowds
of people must be treated differently by law enforcement officers than those which are
contained within a residence where the involved parties are the only people on scene.
Furthermore, the personal experience of officers in certain neighborhoods can color the
way the officer handles the call. Conversely, offenders who have had negative
interactions with law enforcement personnel in the past are likely to be on guard for
perceived slights or mistreatment in a way that many other citizens would not. These
types of information were not available in the current study, but some of these issues
undoubtedly affected the way these incidents played out, and whether or not the use of
force led to violence against the involved officer. These types of issues underscore the
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importance of using varied methods in studying any law enforcement issue to gain as
much information about different aspects of police-citizen interaction as possible.
Other results, while sometimes counterintuitive, followed the course of prior
studies on the subject. Incidents involving single officers were actually much less likely
to involve officer battery. It seems that there would be safety in numbers, but according
to prior research this is not the case. Kaminski and Sorensen (1995) and Wilson,
Brunk, and Meyer (1990) also found that single officers were in a better position than
multiple officers—in these studies, single officers were less likely to be injured. Perhaps
this is because multiple officers automatically respond to situations that are known to be
more volatile at the outset, and during which officer battery and injury are more likely. It
is also possible that when faced with multiple officers, rather than feeling intimidated,
the offenders felt the need to act offensively in order to gain control of the situation or
save face. This would likely be especially true in cases where friends of the offender or
bystanders were nearby watching the interaction11.
Also, cases involving female offenders were much more likely to involve officer
battery than those involving male offenders. While this seems at first to be contrary to
the logic that males are generally more aggressive than females, it does follow what
would be expected from prior research on the subject which indicates that females are
generally more likely to be disrespectful toward officers than males (Engel, 2003).
11

OPD’s use of force forms listed the number of witnesses as a variable, but this was not considered in
the current study because only those witnesses who chose to stay and talk to police and provide their
personal information were included. Therefore, this variable is likely to be unreliable and was excluded
from analysis.
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The other significant factors were basically as expected. Offenders with higher
BMI were slightly more likely to batter officers, while offenders who were known to have
recently consumed alcohol were much more likely to batter officers. Alcohol use has
been shown in previous research to be correlated with many types of violence, including
violence against police officers (Garner & Maxwell, 2002; Kavanagh, 1997), so this
result was not surprising.
Perhaps more surprising than those variables found to be significant were the
variables that were not significant. Several factors that seemed in prior research to be
important were not actually found to be significant in the current study. Part of this
discrepancy may be due to the specific location under study. For example, prior
research has indicated that violence is more prevalent in the summer months (CA
POST, 2001), but in this case season had no effect12. However, in Florida in general
and especially as far south as Orlando, the seasons do not change as they do in more
northern areas. Summer weather lasts through much of the year, so it is logical that the
season would not have the effect found in other studies.
It is also interesting that there was no significant difference between cases
occurring on the weekends rather than weekdays, or cases occurring during nighttime
hours rather than daytime hours. There was also no evidence in these analyses that
the use of intermediate weapons by officers (in this case, Tasers) or the type of call that
officers were responding to was a significant factor in predicting battery. Race was also
12

Because of Florida’s uniquely warm climate, a variable that defined “summer” as April through
September was also run. This variable was not significant either.
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not a factor on either side, nor was age. Incidents with multiple offenders were not
statistically more likely to involve officer battery than those with single offenders.
Furthermore, there was no significant effect found for incidents occurring near large
numbers of businesses selling alcohol versus those with less alcohol sold, and
presumably less demand (except in Model One, and that effect was slight). All of these
variables represent factors that reason and prior research would lead us to believe are
important, but none of them were found to be significant predictors of officer battery in
this dataset.
Furthermore, in this study the demographic characteristics of the officers did not
have a significant effect on officer battery at all. Officer race, age, and sex were all
found to be nonsignificant predictors of officer battery. It appears that some of the
situational factors of the incident had a much greater effect on whether or not officers
were battered than such uncontrollable factors as demographics. This is encouraging in
the sense that many factors that do or do not lead to officer battery can be controlled
and accounted for in training and agency policy.
Of course, the above regression results represent only one part of the current
study. It is important to consider all available data, including geographical factors.
Chapter Six: Spatial Analyses will describe these spatial factors as well as the analyses
used to test their significance and the results.
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CHAPTER SIX: SPATIAL ANALYSES

The purpose of the analyses in this chapter was to examine the geographic
characteristics of police officer battery in Orlando in three ways. First, the analyses
considered the general characteristics of officer battery location and whether or not the
incidents were clustered geographically. Second, the analyses examined the possible
connection between officer battery and social disorganization theory. Finally, the spatial
analyses considered the possible connection between officer battery and alcohol use.
Before any analyses were run, it was important to consider the characteristics of
the study area. The city of Orlando is divided into two main halves, as seen in Figure
18. The northwestern portion of the city jurisdiction contains the downtown area as well
as most all other business and residential districts within the city. The southeastern
portion contains the Orlando International Airport, which was annexed by the City in
1982 (City of Orlando, 2006). There are relatively few instances in which the city police
department responds to the airport area, so while they do patrol this area, it was not as
relevant to this particular portion of the study as the upper portion of the city. Therefore,
all spatial analyses were focused on the more northern and western portion of the city in
an effort to avoid any outlier effects.
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Figure 18: Orlando City Boundary
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As demonstrated in Figure 19 below, the main portion of the city of Orlando (that
portion considered in the current study) is bisected from north to south by Interstate-4 (I4). In the central part of the city, the central business district is located just east of I-4
while some neighborhoods that are known to be high-crime areas, such as Parramore
and Holden, are located just to the west of I-4. These are predominantly AfricanAmerican neighborhoods which are poverty stricken and commonly thought to be
affected by social disorganization. Located in the central business district is an area
concentrated along South Orange Avenue where many bars and nightclubs are located.
These businesses are frequented by both locals and tourists to the area, and together
they comprise an area in which there is a large amount of alcohol consumption and
crowding conditions, especially at nights and on the weekends.
On the far eastern side of the city, Semoran Boulevard runs from north to south
and provides the main route of travel into the Orlando International Airport (see Figure
19). The Semoran Blvd. area has a high Hispanic population and is a common area for
crime occurrences. The Orlando area is known for its tourist attractions such as Walt
Disney World and Universal Studios. Walt Disney World is not located within the city
limits of Orlando, but Universal Studios and some other attractions are, and they can be
found in the southwest portion of the city. It is important to note that while some tourist
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Figure 19: Main Areas of Interest
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attractions are located within the City of Orlando and some are on the other side of the
boundary, there is a large amount of fluidity between the City and Orange County
because of the tourists crossing back and forth in that general area. The crowding and
factors that come with it, such as large quantities of alcohol consumption, are not
confined to one jurisdiction or another.
Figure 20 demonstrates the locations of most13 of the officer battery incidents
within the city limits (n=367). Upon a simple visual inspection, there immediately
appeared to be more clustering of incidents around the downtown areas, especially in
the central business district, and around the Holden and Parramore neighborhoods.
The areas around Semoran Blvd. and the tourist areas showed several incidents, but it
was not immediately clear whether or not there were enough incidents in a small
enough area for them to be considered geographically clustered.

Spatial Analyses

While a visual inspection was a helpful place to start, statistical analyses were
necessary to determine whether or not there was indeed clustering of officer battery
incidents. Three analyses of clustering were conducted14, each successively more

13

Six percent of addresses within City limits were left unmatched due to data errors or technical
difficulties. While there is no generally regarded “acceptable” address match rate (Harries, 1999), a rate
of above 90% is quite high.
14
Refer to Chapter Three: Methods for a description of each type of analysis.
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Figure 20: Locations of Officer Battery Incidents
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statistically robust. The first analysis involved creating a chloropleth map which would
show the frequency of officer batteries by census tract15. When the battery locations
were aggregated to the census tract level, there was the definite appearance of
clustering in the downtown business district as well as in the high-crime neighborhoods
just west of I-4 (see Figure 21). There also appeared to be potential clustering in the
tourist areas in the southwest portion of the city. These positive results on the
chloropleth map provided reason to conduct a more robust type of analysis, the nearest
neighbor index.
The nearest neighbor index (NNI) was conducted as both a 1st-order analysis
and a k-order analysis where k=100 (a common value for these tests). This means that
the index of the 1st-order analysis displayed the strength of clustering between each
incident and its nearest neighbor, while the k-order analysis where k=100 would show
the strength of clustering to the 100th level. In other words, the index would describe the
strength of clustering between each incident and its nearest neighbor, second nearest
neighbor, third nearest neighbor, and so on until the one-hundredth nearest neighbor.
An index value of over 1.0 indicates no statistically significant clustering, while an index
value of less than 1.0 indicates significant clustering and values closer to 0.0 indicate
stronger clustering.

15

Because the census tract boundaries were not designated according to the city limits of Orlando, the
census tract boundaries had to be adjusted slightly to match up with the Orlando boundaries for mapping
purposes. This should not have posed any major problems.
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Figure 21: Officer Battery Incidents by Census Tract
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The results of the 1st-order nearest neighbor index can be found in Table 3. The
index value of 0.33874 indicates strong clustering between each incident and its nearest
neighbor. The k-order analysis to 100 also indicated that the clustering of officer battery
incidents was strong, where even to the 100th order the index value was well under 1.0
at 0.61321 (see Table 4, next page). For complete results and associated statistics of
both the 1st-Order NNI and the k-order (k=100) NNI, see Appendices F and G
respectively.

Table 3: Results of 1st-Order Nearest Neighbor Index

Sample Size

367

Mean Random Distance

1890.14 feet

Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance

640.27 feet

Standard Deviation of Nearest Neighbor Distance

1249.97 feet

Minimum Distance

0.00 feet

Maximum Distance

92027.24 feet

P-value (one tail)

0.0001

P-value (two tail)

0.0001

Nearest Neighbor Index

0.33874

The nearest neighbor analysis is a statistically robust strategy, and in this case
the analyses indicated that there was strong geographical clustering of officer battery
incidents, but this type of analysis does not describe where clustering occurs. For a
reliable test of the location of clustering, a quartic kernel density interpolation was
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conducted. By weighting incidents’ location in reference to a grid of the entire study
area, interpolations can provide information as to the location as well as strength of
clustering. The results of the kernel density interpolation, which demonstrates stronger
clustering

Table 4: Results of k-Order (k=100) Nearest Neighbor Index

Sample Size

367

Mean Random Distance

1890.14 feet

Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance

640.27 feet

Standard Deviation of Nearest Neighbor Distance

1249.97 feet

Minimum Distance

0.00 feet

Maximum Distance

92027.24 feet

P-value (one tail)

0.0001

P-value (two tail)

0.0001

Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 1

0.33874

Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 2

0.40725

Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 3

0.43150

…

…

Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 98

0.61450

Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 99

0.61417

Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 100

0.61321

with higher z-scores and thus darker color shades, indicated that there was extremely
strong clustering centered in the downtown business district and emanating out west of
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I-4 to the Holden and Parramore neighborhoods. In this analysis, there was no
significant clustering found in either the tourist district or in the Semoran Blvd. area (see
Figure 22 below).
Upon determining the extent and location of clustering of officer battery incidents,
the next step was to attempt to determine what factors might lead these areas to display
more violence against officers. One potential explanation comes from social
disorganization theory, in which areas of higher social disorganization (often indicated
by high poverty, low educational attainment, and high residential mobility among other
factors) are also high crime areas. To compare areas with more officer batteries to
areas of high social disorganization, a chloropleth map was produced which showed the
social disorganization of census tracts using the scale created earlier in this study16.
Then, the chloropleth map of officer batteries (Figure 21, page 96) was compared with
the chloropleth map of social disorganization (see Figure 23).
It was obvious upon visual comparison that the main areas of officer battery did
not match up to the most disorganized areas as expected. The most dangerous area
for officers, the downtown business district/bar area, was not found to be highly
disorganized. The tourist areas, also dangerous to officers, were not overly
disorganized either. Conversely, many areas of the city were demonstrated to be highly

16

See Chapter Three: Methods for a complete description of the social disorganization scale.
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Figure 22: Kernel Density Interpolation of Officer Batteries
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Figure 23: Social Disorganization Levels by Census Tract
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disorganized but not overly dangerous to officers. The areas extending west and north
from Parramore and Holden were highly disorganized, as were some tracts along
Semoran Blvd. and a few small tracts just north of the main tourism area; however,
none of these areas was overly dangerous for officers. There may have been several
reasons for this disjunction. High violence areas for officers were largely commercial,
but many common indicators of social disorganization, such as residential mobility and
poverty level, are measures of residential populations and do not apply well to
commercial areas. Therefore, the commercial areas in question may not show the
signs of social disorganization that residential areas would. Also, the suspects may
have been traveling from other areas and may not actually reside in the areas where the
batteries took place. In any case, the main areas of danger for officers seemed to have
only one thing in common that was theoretically connected to the violence against
officers—they are the main areas in which a large amount of the city’s alcohol
consumption and crowding conditions take place.
Considering the apparent lack of connection between officer battery and social
disorganization and the potential connection between officer battery and alcohol use
(and potential crowding), further analyses were conducted that more closely examined
these factors. The locations of businesses with licenses to sell alcohol within the city of
Orlando were retrieved from the website of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco, which is part of the Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation (2010). The list of licenses in Florida was restricted to include only those
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businesses with Orlando addresses (n=2042) and then those locations were further
truncated to include only those licenses that were acquired before or during the study
period (i.e. before December 31, 2008; n=1466). Mapping was then attempted for the
addresses, and once the addresses that were not actually located within the city limits
or those with incomplete information were eliminated, there were 493 addresses of
businesses with current alcohol licenses within the city limits of Orlando.
These 493 addresses were mapped and then aggregated to create a chloropleth
map of the number of businesses licensed to sell alcohol by census tract. A
comparison of the chloropleth maps of officer batteries (Figure 21, page 96) and alcohol
licenses (Figure 24 below) demonstrated a much closer geographical link than that
between officer batteries and social disorganization. Furthermore, when the exact
locations of alcohol-licensed businesses were laid over the chloropleth map of officer
battery by census tract, the correlation could even more clearly be seen (Figure 25).
While there were high concentrations of alcohol-licensed businesses on main roads
without high levels of officer battery, the main clusters of businesses that sell alcohol
were clearly found in the same areas where officers were most at risk. These areas
specifically were the downtown bar area, the neighborhoods just west of I-4 such as
Parramore and Holden, around the main tourist area, and possibly on the east side of
the city near where State Road 408 and Semoran Blvd. meet.
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Figure 24: Alcohol Licenses by Census Tract
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Figure 25: Alcohol-Licensed Business Locations over Officer Battery Levels
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It was possible that certain types of alcohol licenses may also be affecting the
level of violence against officers. Some businesses on the register were licensed to sell
alcohol for off premises consumption only (i.e. liquor stores, package stores). Other
businesses were licensed to sell alcohol for on premises consumption only; these
included bars, nightclubs, social clubs, etc. Still other businesses were licensed to sell
closed packages for off premises consumption as well as alcohol by the drink for on
premises consumption. A map was created to demonstrate the locations of these
different types of alcohol-selling businesses (see Figure 26 below). The types of
alcohol licenses, here designated by color, provide a visual layout of where each type of
licensed business is predominantly located. In the downtown bar area just east of I-4,
most businesses that are licensed to sell alcohol are selling alcohol either for on
premises consumption or for both on or off premises consumption. In the disorganized
areas west of I-4, the opposite is true; businesses are licensed to sell either for off
premises consumption or for both on and off premises consumption. The idea that the
neighborhoods west of I-4 have more closed package alcohol sold for off premises
consumption is consistent with many low income areas. And the downtown business
district has a strong nightlife and several bars and is a popular area for drinking and
partying on site, so this is consistent with the idea that the business district has a
stronger concentration of licenses for consuming alcohol on premises. This could be an
important determinant of violence against officers because on premises consumption
creates more crowding conditions and more disturbances, not only inside the bar or club
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Figure 26: Locations and Types of Businesses Licensed to Sell Alcoholic Beverages
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during business hours but also outside after the bars close down and crowds of people,
most of whom have been consuming alcohol, flood the sidewalks and streets at the
same time.
The tourist area appears to have a mixture of alcohol licenses, those which allow
businesses to sell for on or off premises consumption or both. This is surprising
considering that there is an assumption in the main tourist areas that visitors are going
out to clubs and restaurants to consume alcohol—it appears that they are also
purchasing the alcohol to consume in other areas such as their hotel rooms. Finally, the
last area of interest was around the northern portion of Semoran Blvd. where Semoran
meets State Road 408. In this area, as around the Parramore and Holden areas, there
appears to be a mixture of businesses selling alcohol for off premises consumption or
for both on and off premises consumption.

Discussion

Based on the spatial analyses conducted here, we can conclude that there was a
strong clustering of officer battery incidents in Orlando throughout 2006, 2007, and
2008. Depending on the analysis, there was definitely clustering around the downtown
business district and the neighborhoods just west of I-4 such as Parramore and Holden.
There was potential clustering in the main tourist areas of the city as well and possibly
to a lesser extent around the northern portion of Semoran Blvd.
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Tests of a potential relationship between officer battery and social
disorganization were not so predictable, however. There did not appear to be a strong
relationship between violence against officers and social disorganization, but there did
appear to be a relationship (at least geographically) between violence against officers
and alcohol consumption. Since we know that alcohol use often leads to disturbances
and disturbances are the main type of call that leads to violence against officers (Brandl,
1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997), it is logical that those areas in which more
alcohol is sold (and presumably consumed) would be more dangerous to officers.
The results of this chapter, as well as Chapter Four: Descriptive Statistics and
Chapter Five: Regression Analyses, paint a more complete picture of the characteristics
of violence against police officers and their potential causes than we have had available
before. There are numerous policy implications inherent in these findings. We will
discuss these implications next, along with the conclusions that may be drawn from this
study as well as the most promising directions in which to take our future research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS

Discussion and Policy Implications

The purpose of this study was two-fold. First, this project was a test of sorts for
the criminal events perspective as an explanation for violence against police officers.
Second, the project was designed to determine the validity and strength of potential
predictors of officer violence in Orlando. In the end, the results were mixed. As
discussed in Chapter Three: Methods, support for the criminal events perspective would
be defined as discovering significant predictors of officer violence in all facets of
analysis, including situational and geographic factors as well as individual factors of
both the suspects and the officers involved. Finding significance in every facet of the
battery event would have lent credibility to the idea that officer battery is indeed a
criminal event with a beginning, middle, and end. In this sense, the criminal events
perspective as an explanation of officer violence was not supported. While situational
and geographic factors as well as some factors pertaining to the offenders were found
to be significant, no factor relating to the specific officer involved was significant.
Of course, this may have been due to specific limitations within the study
methodology and data set. Fewer officer variables were available for testing than
situational or offender variables. Perhaps the officer variables that are of the most
importance were not available in this dataset. Although the criminal events perspective
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was not supported as an explanation for violence against officers in this study, it would
be premature to assume that it would not be a useful explanation when using other data
or studying other areas. More research is needed here.
The second goal of the study was to identify potential correlates of officer
violence; two situational variables and three variables related specifically to offenders
were determined to be significant. Regression analyses identified one situational
variable17 as well as all three offender variables, while the other situational variable
(location) was determined through spatial analysis.
A particularly strong finding from this study was that use of force incidents with
multiple officers are more likely to involve battery against at least one of those officers.
Unfortunately, the data available did not provide temporal information as to whether or
not there were multiple officers on scene right away or if those officers arrived on scene
at a later time, but it appears that there is not safety in numbers in these cases, nor do
multiple officers automatically intimidate potential batterers. This is not to say that
officers should not work together and provide back-up for each other as often as
possible; clearly many an officer has been spared assault or worse because his or her
partners were ready to assist in any way necessary. It is to say, however, that officers
should not think and act complacently simply because there are more of them than
there are suspects. Furthermore, officers should not rely on sheer numbers or strength
to control a situation because they assume offenders will be intimidated—clearly this is
17

The independent variable describing the number of alcohol-selling businesses nearby was significant
only in the first model, and therefore it is not included in the discussion here.

111

not the case, and when physical confrontation can be avoided by using verbal skills or
whatever other means are available, it should be.
The other main situational variable of importance was the area in which the
incident occurred. There was strong evidence of clustering of officer batteries in the
City of Orlando. This is an area in which knowledge is power. Knowing which areas
are most prevalent for violence against officers is an excellent way to protect officers.
Simple strategies such as doubling officers per car when possible in those areas or
using more aggressive patrol strategies such as zero-tolerance policing could make a
big difference in the safety of OPD’s officers. By all indications, OPD is aware of the
most dangerous areas for its officers and is currently using these strategies. These
results in this case, then, stress the importance of continuing to do so.
In addition to these situational variables, three characteristics of the offenders
were found to be significant predictors of officer battery. Female offenders were much
more likely to batter officers than male offenders. Although the thinking patterns in the
criminal justice system regarding gender have been changing, stereotypes still exist,
and it appears that they can easily get officers into trouble. Officers must be trained to
be on guard against physical danger from females as well as males, and while they
should continue to consider differences such as physical size of the offender when
making decisions about defensive tactics, they should not assume that women are
“gentler” or less likely to assault or batter them than men. The results of this study
indicate that quite the contrary is true.
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The finding that offender size (measured by weight) was a significant predictor of
officer battery was an interesting one. While this variable was significant to the .01
level, it did not have a major impact on the likelihood of battery. In fact, pound by
pound, incidents involving heavier offenders increased the likelihood of officer battery by
less than 1%. This was not the most useful finding, especially considering that most
officers are naturally going to be more wary of larger offenders without being told to do
so!
The final major finding, while not unexpected, is quite important. Offenders who
were known to have consumed alcohol within the few hours before the incident in
question were much more likely to batter officers than those who were not known to
have recently consumed alcohol. This is in line with prior research on the subject, and
with common sense, but it cannot hurt to stress the point. People who have consumed
alcohol are less inhibited and more likely to do things that they would not ordinarily do.
Even someone who is “stumbling drunk” and lacks the coordination to walk a straight
line may have the strength and willingness to pull a trigger. His or her aim probably will
not be very accurate, but is it worth the chance? The impulsiveness of the intoxicated, if
nothing else, calls for increased vigilance.
The fact that situational and offender characteristics were significant predictors of
officer battery and officer characteristics were not actually bodes well for the practical
usefulness of this study. Officer demographics, after all, cannot be changed by the
officer—sex, age, and race are pretty well determined at this point. The factors that can
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be changed, thankfully, are the ones that appear to matter according to this study. Of
course we cannot change the sex, age, or race of offenders, either, but we can
understand how these differences affect officer interactions and use this information for
policy and training purposes, just as we can be aware of the differences between single
and multiple officer calls and the areas in which the calls are occurring. Understanding
the characteristics of the incidents in which officers are battered and injured is the best
way to combat those batteries and injuries.

Directions for Future Research

This study filled several gaps in prior research. The criminal events perspective
as an explanation for officer violence was tested for the first time. A new data source
was explored, and it provided some crucial information, especially for the local area in
which it was collected. Spatial analyses that had not previously been conducted on
violence against police officers were conducted in this study, and with useful results.
There is, however, much more work to be done.
Studies at other agencies and in other geographical areas are necessary for a
comparison of results. For other agencies that collect use of force data and/or data on
violence against their officers, similar projects could indicate whether or not the results
found here are generalizable to other areas or are mostly specific to Orlando (which is,
after all, a rather unique city). Further support or refutation of the criminal events
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perspective as an explanation of violence against officers could also be discovered
through studies conducted in other areas and at other agencies.
Further investigation is also needed into the disjuncture between areas of social
disorganization and areas of danger to officers. Perhaps there are positive intervening
factors in some disorganized areas that counteract the disrespect for formal social
control agents that would be expected there. Community social service agencies and/or
churches could be mapped and compared in further efforts to determine why some
areas are more or less dangerous for police than others. Along these same lines,
continued investigation is needed into the seemingly strong link between police violence
and alcohol use. It is important to understand whether or not officer violence is affected
by the type of alcohol consumption (i.e. on or off premises) or the characteristics of
those who often use alcohol in the area.
Additionally, more investigation is needed into the nature of the relationship
between officer violence and suspect gender. The current study found, as has prior
research, that females were more likely to batter officers than males. This does not
necessarily mean that female offenders are more dangerous to officers as far as the
chance of injury, however. Future studies into this interplay between gender and officer
violence should attempt to determine whether or not female offenders are also more
likely to injure officers or to use weapons against officers. This knowledge would help
shape training and policy decisions further.
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Finally, it is also absolutely critical that we look into other, new explanations for
officer violence. The explanatory power of the regression models in this study was
paltry. We are obviously missing factors that help determine the outcome of these
incidents. While this type of rigorous statistical testing is necessary and serves a useful
purpose, we are neglecting to investigate these incidents in the detail that cannot be
examined through quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis could provide more indepth information about the perceptions and the interplay of the actions of both the
officer and the offender. Case studies and interviews are necessary next steps in
determining what other traits or conditions might lead officers to be battered, or worse.
In the end, Orlando Police Department has obviously made some very good
decisions regarding the safety of its officers. Hopefully, this study will provide
information that agency administrators can use to further protect their officers and
decrease officer violence in the area. Perhaps this project has also introduced some
new methods of studying violence against police officers that will be useful in other
areas. Maybe it has served to confirm or refute the importance of some variables that
are commonly held as predictors of this type of violence. Maybe it will spurn new
projects that will substantially lower the rate of violence against officers. Meanwhile,
America’s police officers, deputies, and agents will continue to protect us every day and
do the job that most of us cannot, or will not, do.
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APPENDIX B: ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT USE OF FORCE
POLICY AND FORM
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APPENDIX C: IRB APPROVAL LETTER
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APPENDIX D: COMPARISON OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
VARIABLES FROM US CENSUS 2000 AND AMERICAN COMMUNITIES
SURVEY 3-YEAR ESTIMATES FROM 2006-2008 FOR CITY OF
ORLANDO
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US Census 2000

ACS 2006-2008

61.1

57.8

17.8

14.3

3.4

5.3

--% of HH* on public assistance**

2.9

1.4

--% of HH with income below poverty level

13.3

12.7

--% of renter-occupied housing units

59.2

57.9

--% of vacant housing units

8.6

15.8

15.4

17

POPULATION HETEROGENEITY
--% White
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
--% 25 & over with less than high school education
UNEMPLOYMENT
--% 16 & over who were unemployed
POVERTY

HOUSING STABILITY

FAMILY COMPOSITION
--% of female-headed HH

Social Disorganization Variables for City of Orlando from Census 2000 and American
Communities Survey 2006-2008 3-year Estimates
*households
**public assistance=general assistance including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, but not
including food stamps
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APPENDIX E: SPSS LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
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Logistic Regression

Notes
Output Created

28-Jun-2010 15:33:19

Comments
Input

Data

C:\Documents and Settings\Michele\My
Documents\UCF
docs\DISSERTATION\SPSS
files\WORKING_OPD_DATABASE.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data File
Missing Value Handling

Definition of Missing

1812
User-defined missing values are treated as
missing

Syntax

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES
DUMMY_DV
/METHOD=ENTER DTTASER, TIME93A,
VIOLENT, NUMEMPL, NUMOFND,
SUMMER, WEEKEND3, MSFORALCLIC
/METHOD=ENTER OFF1_AGE,
OFF_BMI, OFF1ALC, OFF1WHT,
OFF1_SEX
/METHOD=ENTER EMPL1AGE,
EMPL1WHT, EMPL1SX
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Resources

Processor Time

0:00:00.078
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Notes
Output Created

28-Jun-2010 15:33:19

Comments
Input

Data

C:\Documents and Settings\Michele\My
Documents\UCF
docs\DISSERTATION\SPSS
files\WORKING_OPD_DATABASE.sav

Active Dataset

DataSet1

Filter

<none>

Weight

<none>

Split File

<none>

N of Rows in Working Data File
Missing Value Handling

Definition of Missing

1812
User-defined missing values are treated as
missing

Syntax

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES
DUMMY_DV
/METHOD=ENTER DTTASER, TIME93A,
VIOLENT, NUMEMPL, NUMOFND,
SUMMER, WEEKEND3, MSFORALCLIC
/METHOD=ENTER OFF1_AGE,
OFF_BMI, OFF1ALC, OFF1WHT,
OFF1_SEX
/METHOD=ENTER EMPL1AGE,
EMPL1WHT, EMPL1SX
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
ITERATE(20) CUT(.5).

Resources

Processor Time

0:00:00.078

Elapsed Time

0:00:00.079

[DataSet1] C:\Documents and Settings\Michele\My Documents\UCF
docs\DISSERTATION\SPSS files\WORKING_OPD_DATABASE.sav
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Case Processing Summary
a

Unweighted Cases
Selected Cases

N
Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Percent
1678

92.6

134

7.4

1812

100.0

0

.0

1812

100.0

Unselected Cases
Total

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value

Internal Value

NO BATTERY

0

BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR

1

MORE OFFICERS

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table

a,b

Predicted
DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST ONE
OFFICER OCCUR?
BATTERY

Observed
Step 0

DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST

NO BATTERY
NO BATTERY
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1311

AGAINST 1 OR

Percentage

MORE OFFICERS

Correct

0

100.0

ONE OFFICER OCCUR?

BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR

367

0

.0

MORE OFFICERS
Overall Percentage

78.1

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 0

Constant

-1.273

S.E.

Wald
.059

df

464.792

Sig.
1

.000

Variables not in the Equation
Score
Step 0

Variables

df

Sig.

DTTASER

.183

1

.668

TIME93A

3.516

1

.061

VIOLENT

.620

1

.431

NUMEMPL

30.639

1

.000

NUMOFND

4.112

1

.043

SUMMER

1.275

1

.259

WEEKEND3

1.176

1

.278

MSFORALCLIC

7.805

1

.005

46.119

8

.000

Overall Statistics

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
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Exp(B)
.280

Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

45.568

8

.000

Block

45.568

8

.000

Model

45.568

8

.000

Model Summary

Step
1

-2 Log likelihood
1717.251

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

Square

Square

a

.027

.041

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter
estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table

a

Predicted
DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST ONE
OFFICER OCCUR?
BATTERY

Observed
Step 1

DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST
ONE OFFICER OCCUR?

NO BATTERY
NO BATTERY
BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR

AGAINST 1 OR

Percentage

MORE OFFICERS

Correct

1311

0

100.0

367

0

.0

MORE OFFICERS
Overall Percentage

78.1

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
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B
Step 1

a

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

DTTASER

.058

.121

.231

1

.631

1.060

TIME93A

.179

.125

2.058

1

.151

1.196

VIOLENT

-.146

.167

.764

1

.382

.864

NUMEMPL

.663

.121

30.155

1

.000

1.942

NUMOFND

.327

.233

1.963

1

.161

1.387

-.139

.142

.970

1

.325

.870

WEEKEND3

.068

.123

.309

1

.578

1.071

MSFORALCLIC

.008

.003

6.089

1

.014

1.008

-1.857

.155

142.950

1

.000

.156

SUMMER

Constant

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: DTTASER, TIME93A, VIOLENT, NUMEMPL, NUMOFND, SUMMER, WEEKEND3,
MSFORALCLIC.

Block 2: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

35.704

5

.000

Block

35.704

5

.000

Model

81.272

13

.000

Model Summary

Step
1

-2 Log likelihood
1681.547

a

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

Square

Square
.047

.073
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Model Summary

Step

-2 Log likelihood

1

1681.547

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

Square

Square

a

.047

.073

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter
estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table

a

Predicted
DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST ONE
OFFICER OCCUR?
BATTERY

Observed
Step 1

NO BATTERY

DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST
ONE OFFICER OCCUR?

NO BATTERY
BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR

AGAINST 1 OR

Percentage

MORE OFFICERS

Correct

1299

12

99.1

355

12

3.3

MORE OFFICERS
Overall Percentage

78.1

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 1

a

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

DTTASER

.132

.127

1.090

1

.296

1.141

TIME93A

.095

.132

.510

1

.475

1.099

VIOLENT

-.171

.170

1.017

1

.313

.843

NUMEMPL

.653

.123

28.222

1

.000

1.922

NUMOFND

.276

.241

1.318

1

.251

1.318
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SUMMER

-.146

.143

1.035

1

.309

.865

WEEKEND3

-.022

.126

.030

1

.862

.978

.007

.003

3.776

1

.052

1.007

-.004

.006

.488

1

.485

.996

OFF_BMI

.044

.013

11.790

1

.001

1.045

OFF1ALC

.335

.144

5.440

1

.020

1.398

OFF1WHT

.151

.137

1.223

1

.269

1.163

OFF1_SEX

-.822

.201

16.754

1

.000

.439

-2.212

.406

29.749

1

.000

.109

MSFORALCLIC
OFF1_AGE

Constant

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: OFF1_AGE, OFF_BMI, OFF1ALC, OFF1WHT, OFF1_SEX.

Block 3: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square
Step 1

df

Sig.

Step

1.711

3

.634

Block

1.711

3

.634

Model

82.983

16

.000

Model Summary

Step
1

-2 Log likelihood
1679.836

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

Square

Square

a

.048

.074

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter
estimates changed by less than .001.
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Classification Table

a

Predicted
DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST ONE
OFFICER OCCUR?
BATTERY

Observed
Step 1

NO BATTERY

DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST
ONE OFFICER OCCUR?

NO BATTERY
BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR

AGAINST 1 OR

Percentage

MORE OFFICERS

Correct

1299

12

99.1

355

12

3.3

MORE OFFICERS
Overall Percentage

78.1

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation
B
Step 1

a

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

DTTASER

.120

.127

.891

1

.345

1.128

TIME93A

.097

.133

.527

1

.468

1.101

VIOLENT

-.171

.170

1.015

1

.314

.843

NUMEMPL

.650

.123

27.823

1

.000

1.916

NUMOFND

.289

.242

1.422

1

.233

1.335

SUMMER

-.146

.143

1.039

1

.308

.864

WEEKEND3

-.016

.126

.017

1

.896

.984

.007

.003

3.855

1

.050

1.007

-.005

.006

.557

1

.455

.995

OFF_BMI

.044

.013

12.012

1

.001

1.045

OFF1ALC

.342

.144

5.643

1

.018

1.408

OFF1WHT

.154

.137

1.258

1

.262

1.166

MSFORALCLIC
OFF1_AGE
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OFF1_SEX

-.794

.203

15.332

1

.000

.452

EMPL1AGE

-.006

.009

.462

1

.496

.994

EMPL1WHT

-.030

.141

.044

1

.833

.971

EMPL1SX

-.332

.284

1.369

1

.242

.717

-1.686

.595

8.027

1

.005

.185

Constant

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: EMPL1AGE, EMPL1WHT, EMPL1SX.
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APPENDIX F: FIRST ORDER NEAREST NEIGHBOR ANALYSIS
RESULTS
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Nearest neighbor analysis:
-------------------------Sample size........: 367
Measurement type...: Direct
Start time.........: 05:02:00 PM, 02/06/2010
Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance ..:
Standard Dev of Nearest
Neighbor Distance ...............:
Minimum Distance ................:
Maximum Distance ................:
Based on Bounding Rectangle:
Area ............................:
Mean Random Distance ............:
Mean Dispersed Distance .........:
Nearest Neighbor Index ..........:
Standard Error ..................:
Test Statistic (Z) ..............:
p-value (one tail) ..............:
p-value (two tail) ..............:
Order
*****
1

Mean Nearest
Neighbor Distance (m)
*********************
640.2657

640.27 ft
1249.97 ft
0.00 ft
92027.24 ft
5244620531.50 sq ft
1890.14 ft
4062.02 ft
0.3387
51.57 ft
-24.2346
0.0001
0.0001

Expected Nearest
Neighbor Distance (m)
*********************
1890.1402

End time...........: 05:02:03 PM, 02/06/2010
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Nearest
Neighbor Index
**************
0.33874

APPENDIX G: K-ORDER NEAREST NEIGHBOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
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Nearest neighbor analysis:
-------------------------Sample size........: 367
Measurement type...: Direct
Start time.........: 05:09:39 PM, 02/06/2010
Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance ..:
Standard Dev of Nearest
Neighbor Distance ...............:
Minimum Distance ................:
Maximum Distance ................:
Based on Bounding Rectangle:
Area ............................:
Mean Random Distance ............:
Mean Dispersed Distance .........:
Nearest Neighbor Index ..........:
Standard Error ..................:
Test Statistic (Z) ..............:
p-value (one tail) ..............:
p-value (two tail) ..............:
Order
*****
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Mean Nearest
Neighbor Distance (m)
*********************
640.2657
1154.6359
1529.2280
1889.2978
2100.4331
2586.6202
2884.6122
3224.7118
3492.2139
3747.3059
3934.1686
4109.6161
4336.6483
4527.5845
4677.5674
4879.4958
5061.9409
5306.5336
5422.5612

640.27 ft
1249.97 ft
0.00 ft
92027.24 ft
5244620531.50 sq ft
1890.14 ft
4062.02 ft
0.3387
51.57 ft
-24.2346
0.0001
0.0001

Expected Nearest
Neighbor Distance (m)
*********************
1890.1402
2835.2102
3544.0128
4134.6816
4651.5168
5116.6685
5543.0575
5938.9902
6310.1771
6660.7424
6993.7796
7311.6786
7616.3319
7909.2678
8191.7416
8464.7997
8729.3247
8986.0695
9235.6825

158

Nearest
Neighbor Index
**************
0.33874
0.40725
0.43150
0.45694
0.45156
0.50553
0.52040
0.54297
0.55343
0.56260
0.56252
0.56206
0.56939
0.57244
0.57101
0.57645
0.57988
0.59053
0.58713

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

5592.4115
5745.6137
6019.0096
6163.8732
6307.4145
6442.4001
6566.2761
6665.0773
6775.5019
6880.8559
7004.2635
7165.3279
7323.3502
7426.3264
7496.1714
7606.7651
7691.4162
7772.1360
7903.8108
8005.0485
8185.6870
8380.6354
8494.2895
8624.0343
8741.8469
8883.9008
9014.4293
9085.9510
9221.4266
9383.0689
9434.3735
9505.4622
9644.1935
9722.4566
9784.5692
9858.6672
9970.3532
10036.9639
10100.1237
10204.0918
10248.8528
10313.9026
10376.0572
10482.8831
10528.5444
10586.1056
10644.5991
10718.9500
10758.8799

9478.7268
9715.6950
9947.0211
10173.0897
10394.2438
10610.7906
10823.0064
11031.1411
11235.4215
11436.0541
11633.2274
11827.1145
12017.8744
12205.6537
12390.5879
12572.8024
12752.4139
12929.5307
13104.2541
13276.6785
13446.8923
13614.9785
13781.0148
13945.0745
14107.2265
14267.5359
14426.0641
14582.8692
14738.0061
14891.5270
15043.4813
15193.9161
15342.8761
15490.4037
15636.5396
15781.3224
15924.7890
16066.9746
16207.9130
16347.6363
16486.1756
16623.5604
16759.8191
16894.9790
17029.0661
17162.1057
17294.1219
17425.1379
17555.1763

159

0.59000
0.59137
0.60511
0.60590
0.60682
0.60716
0.60670
0.60421
0.60305
0.60168
0.60209
0.60584
0.60937
0.60843
0.60499
0.60502
0.60313
0.60112
0.60315
0.60294
0.60874
0.61555
0.61638
0.61843
0.61967
0.62267
0.62487
0.62306
0.62569
0.63009
0.62714
0.62561
0.62858
0.62764
0.62575
0.62470
0.62609
0.62470
0.62316
0.62419
0.62166
0.62044
0.61910
0.62047
0.61827
0.61683
0.61550
0.61514
0.61286

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

10806.2247
10846.6147
10907.2290
10977.4604
11013.2674
11074.0605
11151.2030
11234.9613
11295.8870
11342.6988
11416.2739
11573.2875
11718.1094
11824.1937
11896.8641
11984.2872
12087.1945
12172.3382
12258.0561
12310.4812
12385.1897
12448.9659
12507.0238
12599.7185
12664.7699
12746.1281
12784.4109
12825.2034
12909.1074
12957.7597
13016.8190
13062.1492

17684.2585
17812.4053
17939.6367
18065.9722
18191.4303
18316.0292
18439.7861
18562.7180
18684.8412
18806.1713
18926.7237
19046.5131
19165.5538
19283.8597
19401.4442
19518.3204
19634.5009
19749.9979
19864.8235
19978.9891
20092.5061
20205.3854
20317.6375
20429.2729
20540.3015
20650.7333
20760.5776
20869.8438
20978.5409
21086.6777
21194.2628
21301.3045

End time...........: 05:09:41 PM, 02/06/2010
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0.61106
0.60894
0.60800
0.60763
0.60541
0.60461
0.60474
0.60524
0.60455
0.60314
0.60318
0.60763
0.61142
0.61317
0.61319
0.61400
0.61561
0.61632
0.61707
0.61617
0.61641
0.61612
0.61557
0.61675
0.61658
0.61722
0.61580
0.61453
0.61535
0.61450
0.61417
0.61321
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